

The Department of State

bulletin

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The Joint Defense of Western Europe

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE¹

A useful starting point in dealing with the most important questions which must be considered by the committee is to fix clearly in our minds the fundamental problem of which these questions are a part.

The basic problem before us is how best to protect the security of our country against the threat we face.

The source of this threat is clear. It is the powerful military force assembled by the Soviet Union and its satellites, combined with the hostile intentions which the Soviet Union has demonstrated toward the entire non-Soviet world and the willingness it has recently shown to risk general war.

The job of protecting our security against this threat has three parts:

First, to prevent the outbreak of war;

Second, to prevent the Soviet Union from accomplishing its aggressive purposes by means other than war; and

Third, to make certain that the free nations will not be defeated, if war is forced upon us.

All three of these elements are essential in the strategy of our defense as it relates to the threat in Europe, which is what we are primarily concerned with here today. Our primary aim is to prevent an attack against Europe. At the same time, we seek to prevent Europe from being taken over by the Kremlin through other means. And finally, if despite our best efforts there should be an attack on Europe, we want to prevent it from succeeding.

It is important for us to keep in mind that all three purposes are essential to our security and that the building of a strong, integrated force in Europe is vital to each of these elements.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on Feb. 16 and released to the press by the Department of State on the same date.

Some have approached this problem as though the chief, if not the sole question is: "How do we repel the attack after it is launched?"

The trouble with talking about this part of the problem as if it were the main question, or even the question of primary concern to our own security, is that it increases the risk of losing Europe in other ways. It is not only the threat of direct military attack which must be considered but also that of conquest by default, by pressure, by persuasion, by subversion, by "neutralism," by all the paraphernalia of indirect aggression which the Communist movement has used.

If we approached this problem as though our sole concern were how we were going to act after Europe had been attacked, regardless of the human cost, whatever the devastation, then we can scarcely expect our European allies to show much enthusiasm for the prospects of the future. This kind of strategy drives our friends in Europe into a mood of nonresistance, a mood of "neutralism," which is, for them and for all of us, a short cut to suicide.

So our first purpose—and this is something we need to make absolutely clear to our friends in Europe—is to deter the aggressors from attacking Europe. Our primary concern is not how to win a war after it gets started but how to prevent it and how to help Europe stay free in the meantime.

Now, what is it on which we can rely to prevent an attack on Europe?

There are three deterrent factors to be considered. One is the retaliatory power now in our possession—our capability of striking with air power against the centers of aggression. Another is the reserve power which helps to convince the Russians that they could not win in the end. And finally, there are the integrated forces in being of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

This third deterrent factor is the one at issue.

This is the deterrent which is now weak and which we are now striving to build up as quickly and as effectively as we can do it.

A number of questions have been raised about this effort to build up the forces in being in Western Europe. Some have asked why we need to do this—why we can't continue to rely on the deterrent force of our retaliatory air power, and our reserve power elsewhere. Some have argued that this European defense force cannot possibly be made large enough to be effective, while others have argued that this European defense force would be so great a threat to the Soviet Union that it would be provocative. These concerns, although contradictory of each other, have led to a common line of reasoning—that we should not move ahead with our European allies in building a defense force in Western Europe.

Apart from the helpless and defenseless predicament in which this course of action—or more accurately, this course of inaction—would leave us, there are a number of powerful considerations which point to the conclusion that our own security, as well as the security of our allies in Europe, requires vigorous efforts to build an effective defense force in Europe at the earliest possible moment.

One reason why we cannot continue to rely on retaliatory air power as a sufficient deterrent is the effect of time. We have a substantial lead in air power and in atomic weapons. At the present moment this may be the most powerful deterrent against aggression. But with the passage of time, even though we continue our advances in this field, the value of our lead diminishes.

In other words, the best use we can make of our present advantage in retaliatory air power is to move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced collective forces in Western Europe that will continue to deter aggression after our atomic advantage has been diminished.

Another reason why the availability of defense forces in being in Western Europe is necessary is that it enables the free nations to deal more effectively with, and thus to prevent, the various forms of aggression that threaten them. So far we have been talking about the possibility of bold, naked aggression by the Soviet Union itself. But we have seen recent examples of another form of Communist aggression—disguised aggression through a satellite.

We see at the present time the build-up of forces in East Germany and the satellite states. This build-up contains the possibility of overt moves which could be disclaimed by the real center of aggression. In the absence of defense forces in being, satellites might be used for such disguised aggression in the hope that they could get away with it, since the free nations could respond only with the weapons of all-out general war or not at all. The presence of adequate defense forces would remove this temptation.

We have also become familiar with the Communist use of indirect aggression, in which the Communists employ the weapons of fear and threats to undermine confidence and paralyze the will to resist. We saw this happen in Czechoslovakia. The presence of adequate defense forces in being is also a bulwark against this kind of aggression.

The argument is sometimes advanced that the Western European defense forces cannot be made large enough to equal the forces available to the potential aggressor, man for man, and therefore would be useless. The difficulty with this argument is that it considers the European defense forces in isolation, as a sole weapon, instead of considering these forces as a vital adjunct to the other deterrent forces available. It is not the case that ground forces would or could be sufficient by themselves or that air or sea power by themselves could or would be sufficient, but that the three elements of our deterrent forces, taken together, are the best means of preventing an attack from taking place.

However, overwhelming our available air striking power is likely to be in the period ahead of us, the presence of defense forces in being in Western Europe is a vital part of the effectiveness of our air power as a deterrent to attack. Not only do air forces require bases from which to operate, which must be held on the ground by defense forces, but air power alone is not a sufficient deterrent against the risk of a quick all-out effort to seize the continent. Without integrated forces in being, a potential aggressor may be tempted to gamble on the possibility of a quick initial thrust. If there are no forces available on the ground even to slow up this rabbit-punch, our air power, though it worked great damage against the centers of aggression, could not be in a position to prevent the devastation of Europe.

An adequate initial defense is an essential part

of our efforts to deter an attack against Western Europe, and this initial defense can come only through having forces in being in Europe.

All these considerations which apply to our efforts to deter an attack by building collective forces in Europe apply with equal force to the necessities we would face if, despite our best efforts, Europe were attacked.

In the event of an attack the availability of defense forces in Europe would give us time that we would vitally need to bring our other forces into operation. In the meantime these defense forces would oblige the aggressor to use up his available resources, while his home sources of supply were being bombed. These forces would also deny him access to the industrial, human, and other resources of Europe. These are the resources that balance the scales of power. These are the forces that would prevent Europe, in the event of an attack, from having to go through another occupation and liberation.

I believe that the American people understand and agree on the importance of Western Europe to our own security. There was a time when the argument that the United States should concentrate on its own shorelines, and leave the rest of the world to its fate, had some appeal for Americans. But the inadequacy of this approach to our security problem is self-evident from even a brief examination of the fundamental relationship which exists between the United States and Western Europe.

I prefer, as do many Americans, to give great emphasis to our intangible ties with Western Europe. These include our bonds of personal kinship, our mutual intellectual heritage, and our community of social and spiritual values. They also include a common belief in the ideals of democracy and human freedom—in the dignity of the individual and the right of the whole people to exercise control over those who govern them. Many of us believe that these ideals are, in the long run, more powerful than guns and bombs and that they will outlast all the deceptive philosophies which promise so much and give so little. We also know from experience that no nation can be secure in its own liberty if it permits that of its neighbor to be destroyed by aggression or subversion.

But our policy does not rest solely upon these intangibles, important as they are. To those who refuse to see the long-range value of human free-

dom as an asset in itself, let me repeat certain cold, material facts about our relationships with Europe. Outside of our own country free Europe has the greatest number of scientists, the greatest industrial production, and the largest pool of skilled manpower in the world. Its resources in coal, steel, and electric power are enormous. It has a tremendous shipbuilding capacity, essential to control of the seas. Through its overseas connections it has access to a vast supply of raw materials which are absolutely vital to American industry.

As an ally Western Europe represents more than 200,000,000 free people who can contribute their skills, their resources and their courage to our common defense. Under the heel of an aggressor Western Europe would represent 200,000,000 slaves, compelled to bend their energies and employ their resources for the destruction of the United States and the remainder of Western civilization. Under present world tensions there are but two possibilities for Europe. It will either be an adequately defended ally, a great addition to the defense of freedom, or it will fall under the control of the Kremlin, multiplying the military might of the Soviet armies.

The recent questions that have been raised about the importance of Western Europe to our security appear to be based on wishful assumptions which must be examined in the light of certain hard facts. If continental Western Europe were to fall, the British Isles would be placed in grave peril. We cannot assume that, if Western Europe were to come under Soviet control, its productive capacity would not be put to use against us or that governments in exile would continue to hold within the free world the overseas areas with which they now have strong ties and which produce so many of the basic raw materials on which our military strength depends. If the Western Hemisphere were to stand alone only a partial picture of our peril can be gaged by considering the difficulties of obtaining access to the strategic materials necessary to maintain a defense effort of the size now contemplated. A true picture can be obtained only if one considers what our position would be like if 87 percent of the world's manpower, and more than half of its productive capacity, were to fall under the control of international communism.

The North Atlantic Treaty reflects the three essential elements of our security effort: to prevent

an attack; to prevent Europe from being conquered by other means; and to prevent Europe from being taken by force.

A great deal of the public discussion of the North Atlantic Treaty has centered around article 5 of the treaty. Article 5 provides that an attack against one member shall be considered as an attack against all. But the treaty does not limit itself to a consideration of what shall be done *after* an attack. As I have already pointed out, we are more concerned with preventing the attack by taking appropriate measures in advance to insure that it cannot succeed.

The preamble of the treaty states the determination of the 12 nations to safeguard the freedom of their peoples and their resolution to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the *preservation* of peace and security. In consequence, article 4 provides for consultation whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the members is threatened.

And article 3 deals specifically with this matter of primary concern. It states:

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

These provisions of the treaty spell out the intent of all 12 nations to work out an integrated defense now, not to wait and develop such a defense only if an attack occurs. It has been stated over and over again that the fundamental purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty is to preserve peace. This we are seeking to do in the only way in which it can be done—by making certain in advance that aggression will not succeed.

As General Marshall indicated yesterday in his testimony,² Congress fully recognized this in drafting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The Congress incorporated the requirement that the President of the United States approve recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which may be made by the North Atlantic Treaty Council and Defense Committee before the bulk of the funds authorized by the act could be made available.

Such a recommendation for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area was made by the

Treaty Council and the Defense Committee and on January 27, 1950, was approved by the President. Implied in the approval of this strategic concept was the idea of balanced collective forces. Our military planners quickly came to the conclusion that it was essential to build upon the basis of balanced collective forces, not balanced national forces. A balanced collective force permits great economies and greatly enhanced military effectiveness.

We took the leadership in advocating this step, and it was with satisfaction that I, as the Chairman of the Council, announced agreement on this principle in May 1950.

The next major development was stated in the following announcement by the President on September 9:

"On the basis of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense, I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area. The extent of these increases and the timing thereof will be worked out in close coordination with our North Atlantic Treaty partners. A basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe. Our plans are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on their part. The purpose of this measure is to increase the effectiveness of our collective defense efforts and thereby insure the maintenance of peace."

Here again let me emphasize that there was no intention to create a North Atlantic ground force which taken by itself would match the Soviet and satellite forces. What this step did was to accelerate the formation of a balanced force in Europe which, when added to our other sources of strength in the free world—that is, our retaliatory power and the vast uncommitted reserves—would support the policies already outlined.

For some time prior to the President's announcement, the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic countries and their military advisers had been working on the number and types of forces required for the defense of Western Europe in

² See p. 328.

accordance with the strategic concept I mentioned a moment ago.

At meetings in the spring of 1950, an estimate was given preliminary approval for planning purposes by the Defense Ministers and by the Council, which requested the Defense Ministers to refine it further. Meanwhile each country was requested to build up its forces available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as rapidly as possible, in the knowledge that any feasible action would be well within the limits of any possible revision.

At the October 1950 meeting of the Defense Ministers, the requirements for defense of the North Atlantic area were further considered. They were regarded as being sufficiently refined to furnish the goals both for North Atlantic Treaty organizational planning and for the guidance of national efforts to increase national forces. At the same meeting the Defense Ministers received from each country time-phased programs for creating forces for the defense of the North Atlantic area.

On the basis of the estimated requirements and the national programs, it appeared that we had a sound basis for reaching within a reasonable period of time our goal of forces adequate to perform the mission of defending Western Europe, although it was clear at the time, and it is clear now, that additional effort on the part of all the partners was and is required.

There remained the task of developing the most efficient and economical organization and command structure for integrating these national forces. It was the approval of this organization and command structure which was the significant accomplishment of the meeting of the Council at Brussels in December.

The Council unanimously requested the President of the United States to designate a Supreme Commander—General Eisenhower—to head that force.

The integrated force represented a further accomplishment in that it provided the most acceptable basis on which Western Germany might add its strength to our common cause of defending freedom.

In my view these actions represent real progress. True, much remains to be done before we achieve our goal of an adequate, integrated defense force. However, our allies are now taking

steps which bring us measurably closer to realization of our ultimate goal.

Roughly speaking the combat forces of our European allies may be expected to double in the next year.

General Eisenhower has reported to you on the will and determination of our treaty partners to defend themselves in this common effort, and I fully share his views.

In the current discussions of what our actions should be in relation to these matters, it seems to me that there is substantial agreement on certain vital points.

First, there is general acceptance of the vital importance of a free Western Europe to our own existence.

Second, there is no dispute concerning the basic principles underlying the North Atlantic Treaty.

Third, there is general agreement on the necessity of increasing the strength of our own land, sea, and air forces.

Fourth, it is generally agreed that the primary purpose of these policies is not just to keep us out of a land war in the North Atlantic area but to prevent there being any war in that area.

Fifth, there also seems to be general agreement that we should send some additional troops to Europe to do our part in helping to build an integrated force, as one of the necessary deterrents to war.

What, then, is the issue? Fortunately it is a very narrow one. It involves the amount, the manner, and timing of the build-up of our ground forces now in Europe in the interests of the security of this country.

General Marshall has told you the size of the force which we have had in mind contributing under present conditions. Of course the contribution of this country on the sea and in the air is understandably greater.

But it is not only the size of our contribution which is important, but the manner of it. The spirit of our participation is in the final analysis directly related to the morale of this entire operation, and morale, as General Marshall emphasized yesterday, is the vital ingredient of our security system.

We are bound to our allies by ties of common interest, and a clear appreciation of these ties is the fundamental basis of the actions we are here discussing.

The North Atlantic Treaty is a voluntary association of 12 free nations determined to preserve their security through collective action. In taking steps under article 3 of the treaty to develop collective capacity to resist armed attack, no nation can be compelled to take steps contrary to its convictions, and none is obligated to ignore its national interests. The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made it clear that in building up the collective capacity to resist armed attack each nation "would determine for itself what it could most effectively contribute in the form of facilities, military equipment, productive capacity, manpower, etc." The thing that really holds the integrated force together is the continuing conviction that the national interest of each party is most effectively served by working together through the integrated force.

Finally, I should like to speak to the suggestion that we await the full development of Europe's own defensive force before making our contribution. The need for the strength to deter aggression is immediate, and we have already learned how swiftly events may move in the modern world. Our allies are building their forces *now*; the time for our own contribution is *now*. If each of the North Atlantic nations should wait to appraise its partners' efforts before determining its own, the result would be as disastrous as it would be obvious. Whatever risks we may run by following the policies which our country has pursued thus far, the greatest risk of all is that we might once again hear the bitter refrain: "Too little and too late." And this time there may be no opportunity to remedy the mistake.

There can be no real question as to America's willingness to contribute its fair share of manpower and equipment to the defense of the North Atlantic area. But we have another contribution to make which is equally vital—the spark of leadership. Since World War II the Congress and the Executive Branch have recognized this fact and have cooperated fully in performing the many tasks which the role of leadership involves. From the formation of the United Nations to the recent designation of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty forces, this country has remained continuously in the front ranks of the struggle to assure peace, freedom, and security throughout the world.

We sometimes forget the historic nature of the steps through which we have passed in the past

5 years in our efforts to establish peace and security in the world.

We sometimes lose sight of the profound advance which is represented by the close association which has grown up among the nations of the North Atlantic area and the significance of this association for the entire world.

We have passed through the period of organization; we have passed through the phase of planning; we have passed through a time of the awakening of people to the nature of the true danger in the world. We are now deep in the period of action.

We must carry forward the construction of the forces upon which the hopes of peace of the entire civilized world are founded.

At this moment there could be no greater contribution to the cause of peace than for the Government of the United States, in all its branches, to reaffirm the course of action on which we are moving.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE*

In regard to the question under consideration this morning, it seems to me that fundamentally the real issue is what should we do, the United States, in our own self-interest as a nation.

Whatever we do in the way of giving military assistance to Western Europe naturally requires the wholehearted support of the Nation. The trouble seems to be somewhat a state of confusion in the public mind, and for evident reasons, as to just what the situation is and, more specifically, what are the military necessities.

In one sense this is not a new issue for you gentlemen to be discussing in this room, because many of you considered much the same issue when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was considering the Vandenberg resolution, S. R. 239 of the Eightieth Congress.

Much the same issue also was before you a few months earlier when I was called to testify here in support of the European Recovery Program.

The action of the Senate in 1949 when it voted 82 to 13 in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty, and then 55 to 24 in favor of the military-aid program, was, I took it to be, a confirmation of the view that the independence of the North Atlantic

* Made before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on Feb. 15 and released to the press by the Department of Defense on the same date.

community of nations was of vital importance not only to the further development of free and democratic governments but also to the security of this country. To be more specific, in enacting the military-aid program your committee added to the basic legislation a requirement that the bulk of the funds to carry out the program would not be available until there had been prepared and then approved by the President integrated plans for the defense of the North Atlantic area.

Since then there have been five meetings of the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, at the fourth of which I presided. In addition there have been numerous meetings of the Military Committee, in which General Bradley represented the United States, and a number of meetings of the North Atlantic Council, at which the Secretary of State represented the United States. Further, the Standing Group, consisting of one representative from the United Kingdom, one from France, and one from the United States—General Bradley representing this country—has been in almost daily session.

Out of all of these meetings has emerged, as Congress expressly stipulated, a plan for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area—a plan which will succeed or will fail, depending upon two fundamental factors: first, the support which it receives from this country and the other nations associated with us; and second, the ability with which it is carried out by General Eisenhower and the staff he is now assembling. Regarding the second point, I am sure I am right in the belief that none of you have any misgivings. It is the first point to which your deliberations here appear to be addressed.

Please permit me to state the issue as I see it, in a rather different form. I assume that no one will differ from my belief that the United States will be safer—that is, more secure—if governments friendly to the United States are in power throughout the North Atlantic community. If this is correct, the question then resolves itself into the problem of how the nations of the North Atlantic community can best protect their independence. This is the problem to which the North Atlantic Treaty was addressed, and it is the problem to which all of our discussions under that treaty have been addressed.

In my opinion the course outlined by our planning is the logical one. We are building up in the United States and in each of the nations of the

North Atlantic community stronger armed forces. We are not building up these stronger forces for any aggressive purpose, but in order to enable us to defend ourselves if we should be attacked. Also our aim is primarily to deter aggression if that be possible and to defeat aggression if, in spite of all our efforts, the actions of the Soviet Union or its satellites should precipitate another world war.

Fundamental to all of our efforts in this regard is the immediate start toward the creation in Western Europe of strong and integrated forces—land, sea, and air—in such proportions to one another as appears reasonable and practicable.

As General Eisenhower pointed out in his recent testimony here, the United States forces will constitute only a minor portion of these proposed integrated forces—the major portion being furnished by the Western European nations. This is particularly true in the matter of ground forces. Because of the great amount of discussion which has been centered on the subject of ground forces, I have obtained the express permission of the President to discuss with you the specific strength of the ground forces which the United States has planned to maintain in Europe in the present emergency.

I take this step reluctantly because of the security considerations involved—but I have reached the conclusion that there is a greater peril to our security through weakening the morale of our allies by a debate based upon uncertainties than there can possibly be through the public disclosure of our planned strength figures.

To be specific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me and I have so recommended to the President—and the President has approved—a policy with respect to our forces in Europe which looks to the maintenance by us, in Europe, of approximately six divisions of ground forces.

We already have there, on occupation duty, about two divisions of ground forces. Our plans, based on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore contemplate sending four additional divisions to Europe.

While this number does not appear to represent in pure fighting power a large contribution to the immediate defensive strength of Western Europe, it does represent a small Army unit of high efficiency and, we believe, a tremendous morale contribution to the effectiveness and build-up of the projected ground forces the North Atlantic

Treaty nations are undertaking to develop under General Eisenhower's direction and command.

As President Truman pointed out in his announcement on September 9, 1950, "a basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe."

General Eisenhower outlined to you the responsibility which he possesses, and which he intends to exercise, to assure that all members of the North Atlantic Treaty contribute the maximum amount of strength which their geographic, economic, and manpower situations permit. In the key position to which he has been named at the request of the nations which make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, General Eisenhower will be in a position to insist that all members of the North Atlantic Treaty play their full parts in this vital undertaking.

Proportionately the American contribution will be greater in air and in naval forces than in ground forces, for the greater strength of the United States is in the air and on the sea. Proportionately also, our contribution will be greater in the production of munitions than in the provision of manpower—for the industrial capacity of the United States is the greatest of any of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In all that we are doing, as just outlined, we are specifically carrying out the instructions of the Congress with respect to the preparation, and the approval by the President, of integrated plans for the defense of the North Atlantic area. As a result of the various steps outlined earlier, these plans are now well advanced, and General Eisenhower as you know has assumed supreme command.

In order for him to succeed in this most difficult and critical of assignments, it is essential that he not be deprived of that freedom of action which is so necessary to a military commander. I realize, of course, that whenever this issue of flexibility is raised some people will say, "If the fighting starts in Europe, the military commanders will be given complete freedom of action."

But what we want above everything else is something infinitely more important: namely, a certain freedom of action to establish a deterrent against the development of a general war.

Moving in an international setting in a military way is at best fraught with many and often great difficulties. We had them throughout the last world war, but we successfully overcame the problems and proceeded to a victorious conclusion of the war. In this situation, though, we have a far more delicate and more dangerous situation to deal with. The most important, the greatest factor in the creation of military strength for Western Europe in my opinion is the build-up of morale—of the will to defend, the determination to fight if that be necessary. And because of the events of the past few years and the increasing threat presented by the Soviet Union, we have an exceedingly difficult situation with which to deal, in the way of preparations which we hope will enable us to avoid war and will help us to take the necessary action if war is thrust upon us. Under these conditions, having in mind the various measures which have been taken by the Senate in regard to the North Atlantic community, the fewer limitations you impose upon the Military Establishment the better off we will be. And incidentally I would say, gentlemen, that it is not a question today of having large bodies of troops ready to march down to the docks and embark for Europe. Our problem is the creation of troops. The limiting factor today, by far the most critical factor, is the long time yet required to do this.

Those of you who are members of the Armed Services Committee have been addressing yourselves to this problem for many weeks, and I will therefore not repeat here what we are doing to achieve this build-up as rapidly as possible.

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF¹

When I supported the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, I looked at the problem from the military viewpoint, and I gave five reasons in support of our joining the pact:

First, eleven friendly nations assure us that they will stand with us.

Second, eleven friendly nations signify that, to the limit of their abilities to resist, no aggressor could count them among his satellites.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee on Feb. 16 and released to the press by the Department of Defense on the same date.

Third, from a purely military standpoint, the combined population of these twelve nations is more than 300 millions of people—an important factor to the group of nations, and especially to our nation, in the event we are ever called upon to defend ourselves in another total war.

Fourth, the industrial potential of our eleven friends is not small. Their combined steel production in 1950 (and including Western Germany) is estimated at 52 million tons, while we produced 97 million tons in the United States. Their natural resources, and their ability to manufacture the weapons of war as well as the basic life-giving commodities of peace are important contributions to the security of the Western world. And like the population question, the transfer of the industrial potential of any one of these nations, from our combination to any aggressor, would be a double loss.

There was a fifth and most important reason that we should join the pact. The eleven other nations hold the land we must defend. Our strategy, in case we are attacked, relies on sufficient integrated forces of land, sea, and air power to carry the war back to the aggressor. Plans for the common defense of the existing free world must provide for the security of Western Europe, for that part of the free world is almost as vital to our security as our own territory. If the defense plans for the free world demand that we protect the great potential of Western Europe, then we cannot abandon those countries to the terrors of another enemy occupation, with only a hope of subsequent liberation. These nations, face to face with communism's perimeter in Europe, are already in positions vital to the defense of the free world.

Today, along with General Eisenhower, I am in favor of increasing the number of ground troops and their auxiliary tactical air support to be stationed in Western Europe. Here are my reasons:

First, the two United States divisions now in Germany as part of the occupation would, if war came, be in great danger. Increasing that number to approximately six divisions would immeasurably improve their ability to defend themselves. I agree with General Eisenhower that the increased forces would be able to take care of themselves under almost any conditions, given the adequate air and sea support of which we are capable.

Second, the morale of Western Europe is one of the most important factors in its defense. Free nations must have the will to fight. By sending additional troops overseas soon, we give reassurance that we intend to help them defend themselves. Their morale and their will to fight will certainly grow with every increase in the armed strength on the frontiers.

Third, although the Soviet Union has not been able to prevent the economic recovery of Western Europe, some people insist that it will not tolerate the military recovery. However, in my opinion, this increase in collective military strength is needed as a deterrent to the aggressive intentions of Soviet Russia. Weakness can only invite attack.

Fourth, we member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty cannot withhold our own contributions to the collective security, waiting to see what another member contributes. This is not the time for suspicious scrutiny, and we, of all the countries can most appropriately assume the role of generous leadership. If we all hang back, how long will it be before Soviet Russia makes a laughing stock of our entire effort toward collective security?

Fifth, if worse comes to worst, and we are engaged in an all-out war, where do we choose to fight it? Here in the United States, or in other parts of the world?

I would rather fly our planes from North Africa, from France, and from Norway than from Florida, from Michigan, and from Westover Field in Massachusetts. I think many Americans would agree with me in this choice, despite the unwelcome necessity of sending our planes and ships and soldiers to foreign lands before aggression strikes. For we cannot base our planes and ships on fields and ports that are undefended. The adequate defense of an area—and especially the important area of Europe—will require American divisions.

I believe that the false impression that we were planning to send large numbers of ground forces to Western Europe has now been dispelled. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and the President on the number of land troops in Europe was, in substance, as follows:

It is our opinion that additional U. S. forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at

the earliest practicable date so that there will be no chance for doubt of American interest in the defense rather than the liberation of Europe. This should increase the will of our allies to resist. U. S. forces in Europe should include sufficient tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and the forces should be in place and ready for combat as expeditiously as possible. We are in favor of increasing our ground strength to approximately six divisions, and our tactical air force accordingly.

Certainly, these modest forces, with their supporting troops, cannot be interpreted honestly as large masses of land troops. While they minimize the danger to our present occupation forces, they could in no way incite an enemy to attack in fear, nor will they supplant the need for the great increase in the ground forces that the Western European nations must mobilize for General Eisenhower's new command.

I would like to emphasize one more thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have carried forward in all of their recommendations to the President, and in all of their statements to their fellow members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have stated unequivocally, in open meetings and informally, that "plans to commit U. S. forces for Western Europe are based upon the expectation that they will be met with similar efforts on the part of the other nations involved. It is now squarely up to the European signatories (if we carry out our part of the bargain) to provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense. Firm programs for the development of the forces of other nations are, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a prerequisite to our sending these additional forces—land, air, or navy—to the European area."

We have made it clear that the schedule on which we send men to Europe, and the rate at which we send them to reinforce our own garrisons, and their continued participation as part of General Eisenhower's new command, will depend on the effort the Europeans make in their own behalf and in behalf of our joint collective security effort.

With that case made perfectly clear to these other nations, I see no reason why we should not proceed as rapidly as possible with the steps that obviously must be taken if the North Atlantic Treaty is ever to deter war rather than to invite early aggression.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Amending Section 3224 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code Relating to the Transportation of Narcotic Drugs. S. Rept. 2510, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 7891] 2 pp.

Incorporating the American Society of International Law. S. R. 2529, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 7900] 2 pp.

Providing for Recognition and Endorsement of the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center. S. Rept. 2556, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 511] 2 pp.

Pan American Union. S. Rept. 2565, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 5902] 3 pp.

The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951. S. Rept. 2567, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 9526] 36 pp.

Amending the Philippine Property Act of 1946. S. Rept. 2576, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 8546] 3 pp.

Payment of Certain Portuguese Claims. S. Rept. 2577, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 9484] 4 pp.

Extradition Treaty With the Union of South Africa. S. Ex. Rept. 14, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive K, Eightieth Congress, second session] 2 pp.

Charter of the Organization of American States. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive A, Eighty-first Congress, first session, the charter of the Organization of American States. S. Ex. Rept. 15, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 19 pp.

Protocol With the Union of South Africa Relating to Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the protocol between the United States and the Union of South Africa, signed at Pretoria on July 14, 1950, supplementing the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for Establishing Rules of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons which was signed at Cape Town on April 10, 1947. S. Ex. T, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 3 pp.

Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 206—a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee. H. Rept. 3135, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 54 pp.

Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 9853—a bill to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. H. Rept. 3179, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 34 pp.

Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951. H. Rept. 3193, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 9920] 50 pp.

Amending the Tariff Act of 1930 So As To Extend to Flaxseed and Linseed and Flaxseed and Linseed Oil the Privilege of Substitution for Draw-Back on Duty Purposes. H. Rept. 3202, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 8344] 2 pp.

Exempting Textile Machines and Parts From Duty When Imported for the Instruction of Students by Educational, Religious, or Charitable Institutions. H. Rept. 3203, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 8881] 2 pp.

Exempting Textile Machines and Parts From Duty When Imported for the Instruction of Students by Educational, Religious, or Charitable Institutions. H. Rept. 3, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1012] 2 pp.

The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

by Harry N. Howard, United Nations Adviser
Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

I. A SUMMARY

When the fifth session of the General Assembly met in the fall of 1950, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) had been in existence for almost 3 years. Although unable to fulfill a conciliatory role because of the refusal of the northern neighbors of Greece to deal with, or even to recognize the Committee as a legal body of the United Nations, it had performed observation functions with great care and accuracy and had served to focus world attention on the situation along the northern frontiers of Greece. Like its predecessor, the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, it had pointed to the external assistance which had been given to the Communist-dominated Greek guerrilla movement.

The accuracy of the observations of the Special Committee was well attested in the proclamation of the Greek Communist Party on January 30-31, 1949:

In the "Popular Democracies" we found great and wholehearted support, without which we could not have made progress.

Just 2 years later, on January 23, 1951, a proclamation of the Greek Communist Party openly announced:

If in 1946-49 the Democratic Army of Greece had won, our troubles would now be over and we should today have been under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union, exactly the same as the other people's democracies; we should have been free to build and rehabilitate our proud and beautiful country.

Although overshadowed by a number of other questions, and particularly by that of Korea and the Chinese Communist intervention therein, the Greek question occupied a relatively important position in the fifth session of the General As-

sembly of 1950.¹ There was no basic change in the positions adopted by the representatives of the various members during the discussion of the problem. It was recognized, as the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had well stated,² that the situation along the northern frontiers in Greece had improved but that a threat did continue, concerning which the United Nations should remain vigilant, in view, particularly, of the menacing international situation.

The Soviet Union and her satellites maintained their original position that UNSCOB was an illegal body established by a "mechanical majority" of the General Assembly which utilized false witnesses, drew false conclusions, and made false recommendations concerning imaginary threats; whereas, the real threat lay in Anglo-American military and political intervention in Greece, and the problem could only be solved by eliminating the "ceaseless" terror, establishing a general amnesty, holding "free" elections, and liquidating the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. After a brief discussion in the First Committee, which consumed only seven meetings between November 10 and 15, the General Assembly approved the continuation of UNSCOB on

¹ For background see especially: Harry N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, Department of State publication 3909; *The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece* (Department of State BULLETIN Supplement of December 7, 1947); "The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers* (January 1949); *Greece and the United Nations, 1946-1949* (Department of State publication 3845); *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations* (Department of State publication 3785); *Report of UNSCOB to the General Assembly: A Summary Account* (Department of State BULLETIN, September 4, 1950).

² U.N. doc. A/1307.

December 1 by a vote of 53-6-0.³ In view of the changed situation, the Special Committee was continued until the sixth session of the General Assembly in September 1951, unless in the meanwhile it recommended to the Interim Committee its own dissolution, in the light of changing conditions.

The General Assembly by a vote of 53-6-1 also approved a resolution calling for the repatriation of Greek soldiers, who had been taken prisoner by the Greek guerrillas and removed to the countries beyond the northern frontiers of Greece.

Finally, after a discussion of the repatriation of Greek children, by a vote of 50-0-5, the General Assembly approved a resolution on this subject, similar to those of 1948 and 1949, which, in addition, established a standing committee composed of the representatives of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden, to advise and consult with the Secretary-General with the view to the arrangements for repatriation of these children.

II. GREEK QUESTION IN GENERAL DEBATE

Change of Climate in the Greek Case

Although international tension had considerably increased by the time the fifth session of the General Assembly opened on September 19, 1950, primarily because of the aggression which had been committed in Korea, the political climate in the Greek case seemed to have improved appreciably. With the exception of the address of Panayotis Kanellopoulos, head of the Greek delegation, on September 21, there was no reference to the Greek problem in the general debate. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in 1947, 1948, and 1949, Mr. Kanellopoulos was able to state:⁴

Greece presents itself as a victorious democracy which, after a hard struggle of 10 years against totalitarianism of every kind and colour, has entered into a period of peace and of complete internal normality and reconstruction.

During the year which separates us from the last General Assembly, the critical and delicate geographical sector which God and history have entrusted to the Greek nation has not occupied this world Organization with problems of an immediate critical nature. There is, however, one exception, and that is the problem which, unfortunately, remains unsolved and which substantially does not concern Greece alone, but the moral order of the whole world. I refer to the return of the Greek children coercibly abducted from their homes and still undergoing the inhuman totalitarian distortion of their soul and spirit. . . .

Greece, of course, has had the opportunity of experiencing, on the moral level, the good results of the actions of the United Nations. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans set up by our Organization contributed, at a time when public opinion, even in the great western democracies, had fallen into the trap of falsehood and defamation, to restoring, in the eyes of all men of good faith, the truth as regards the tragedy which Greece was undergoing.

³ The third figure in the tabulation of voting will refer to abstentions.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/PV.280, pp. 50-52.

Mr. Kanellopoulos also expressed special gratitude to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the work in Greece. In conclusion, he noted that Greece had "deeply suffered" from the "sly and deceitful" Soviet propaganda "now being turned on the defenders of Korea" and indicated that Greece was making her fullest contribution to the stopping of aggression in that country.

The General Committee: The Agenda

The Greek question was alluded to in the General Committee in connection with the determination of the agenda of the General Assembly. For example, as in previous years, when the matter came before the General Committee on September 21, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Vyshinsky, sought to prevent the Greek question from being placed on the provisional agenda.⁵ The statement of Mr. Vyshinsky had an entirely familiar ring. He objected to the inclusion of the Greek question⁶—

... on the grounds that it had been introduced by the Anglo-American bloc, as in previous years for political purposes in order to divert attention from the terrorism being practised by the monarcho-fascist regime in power against the Greek national liberation movement. The sponsors of the item were attempting to shift responsibility for those repressive measures to Greece's northern neighbours, thus obscuring the real issue in Greece. Peace and order would be restored in that country only when all foreign interference in its internal affairs had been eliminated. Accordingly, United Nations efforts should be directed toward securing the evacuation of all foreign troops and missions from Greece, the implementation of a general amnesty for political prisoners, the holding of elections on a basis of proportional representation, and similar measures designed to establish a democratic regime.

Although Mr. Vyshinsky was to elaborate at great length and with variations on this theme throughout the discussions in the General Assembly, as he had in the past, nevertheless, the General Committee decided by 12-2 to recommend that the Greek question be included on the agenda.

The Plenary Session and the Agenda

The plenary session of the General Assembly considered the agenda on September 26, and there followed the only real substantial discussion of the Greek question in the opening days of the General Assembly. Ambassador Panyushkin (U.S.S.R.) immediately opposed inclusion of the item since, he said,

There are absolutely no grounds for presenting such an item before the Assembly.⁷

Repeating the Soviet Union's propaganda with

⁵ U.N. doc. A/BUR/123.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/BUR/SR.69, p. 2.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/PV.284, pp. 103-104.

respect to the Greek case, Ambassador Panyushkin charged:

... the so-called problem of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece is really a screen for an attempt by the Anglo-American bloc to distract the attention of world public opinion from the unceasing terrorism to which the authorities in Greece are subjecting the Greek people, and is intended to conceal the measures taken to support that regime. That, and that alone, is the real reason why this question has been raised at the fifth session of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Panyushkin also asserted that by including this item "the reactionary Anglo-American circles" were merely trying to "shift the responsibility for the situation which has arisen in Greece to that country's northern neighbours." The real issue, he said, was:

... not threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece on the part of her northern neighbours, but the need to put an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Greece and to withdraw foreign armies and missions from the country.

If the situation in Greece is to return to normal, an end must be put to the savage terrorism practised by the Greek Government which, with the assistance of United Kingdom and United States armed forces, has resorted to mass punishments and other forms of repression to quell the liberation movement of the Greek patriots; a general amnesty must be proclaimed; elections must be held on the basis of proportional representation, and other measures must be taken to establish and secure a democratic regime in Greece.

Mr. Kanellopoulos (Greece) replied to the Soviet charges concerning the alleged terror in Greece in some detail. Among other things, he remarked that there was no terror in Greece and that no one had been executed in that country since October 1949. Mr. Kanellopoulos also referred to the clemency measures in Greece, and stated that the Soviet delegation—

... is not unmindful of the fact that Greece represents a rare if not unique case since it persists in following a policy of mercy toward the fifth column, which did not hesitate to carry out its threats of rebellion, despite the fact that that policy seriously endangers its security.

Mr. Kanellopoulos then referred to the problem of repatriation of Greek children and to the fact that none have been returned in spite of the resolutions of 1948 and 1949. He further stated that the good offices of the Soviet Union might have been useful in that respect and also in the case of the 1,316 members of the Greek armed forces who had been taken prisoner by the guerrillas and transported beyond the northern frontiers of Greece.⁸

The representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Hoffmeister, supported the Soviet thesis on this question, and remarked that—

this puppet comedy is to be forced on to our programme while our interest is focused on the great tragedy of the Greek people.⁹

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland) became indignant and referred to the alleged "designs of Greece towards Bulgaria and Albania," remarking that "we know that the Greek Government would like to extend its territories at the cost of its neighbours." Mr. Katz-Suchy charged that the Greek representative was merely making cheap political propaganda out of the question of the Greek children, and he then expounded on the theme of the "ceaseless terror in Greece" and claimed that hundreds of citizens of Greece had appealed to Generalissimo Stalin to act to save their lives, seeking support from him.¹⁰

Mr. Prica (Yugoslavia) largely confined himself to requesting that the subject of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" and that of the repatriation of Greek children be considered separately. He remarked that—

owing to the developments which have taken place in the course of the last two years, the question which was to have formed the subject matter of the report of the Special Committee has lost its former significance and has, in fact, become an internal affair of Greece.¹¹

The General Assembly decided by a vote of 26-6 to include the question of "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" on the agenda and, by a vote of 56-1, to include the question of the repatriation of Greek children.

SOVIET MANEUVER CONCERNING "CEASELESS TERROR" AND "MASS EXECUTIONS"

That the Soviet delegation, together with the Soviet satellites, intended to lay down a propaganda barrage with respect to death sentences and alleged executions in Greece, although no executions had occurred in that country since one on September 29, 1949, was foreshadowed throughout the year 1950.¹²

In August 1950, Mr. Malik, the President of the Security Council, submitted a number of charges concerning the alleged situation in Greece, in which he claimed that 45 citizens had been deprived of elementary rights and were under "threat of execution" because of their "democratic convictions."¹³

On the last day as President of the Security Council, August 31, 1950, Mr. Malik sought to divert the attention of the Council from discussing the Korean problem by again introducing propaganda on Greece, and he actually offered a resolution to that body to request the Greek Government "to put a stop to the execution of the death

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹² As an example, see U.N. docs. A/AG.16/935, 939, 942, 946, 953, 954, 955, 971, 980, 992.

¹³ See especially, U.N. docs. S/1735, 1736, 1737, 1739.

sentences of 45 active members of the National Resistance Movement."¹⁴ The general reaction in the Security Council was that this was merely a transparent maneuver on the last day of his presidency to delay action with respect to Korea, to distract attention from Korea, and to make what propaganda he could out of the Greek situation following the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in 1949.

Among others, Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), opposed the Soviet proposal, stating that¹⁵—

for the representative of a country which maintains millions of its own compatriots in slave labour camps in unspeakable conditions, which has frequently transported whole populations in cattle trucks to Siberia, whose whole way of life is based on recruiting slaves for the labour force by means of the secret police—for the representative of such a government to denounce other governments for alleged misdemeanours as regards political prisoners is just about as nauseating a spectacle as that of Satan rebuking sin. . . .

The matters with which the communication from the President deals obviously do not constitute a threat to the peace. They are clearly within the sphere of Greek domestic jurisdiction, and the United Nations under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is therefore precluded from discussing them.

Sir Gladwyn did not doubt that during the fifth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet representative would have—

the opportunity of airing the views of his Government, which will, no doubt, be repeated interminably by the Soviet representatives at the Assembly when the Greek question is debated by that body.

Ambassador Austin (U.S.) also opposed discussion of this spurious and "strange" communication, because, he said:¹⁶

Among all the wild changes contained in this item, there is no single coherent suggestion that there is a threat to international peace or even an international dispute.

In the end, the Soviet proposal was rejected by a vote of 9-2, with only the Soviet and Yugoslav representatives supporting it.¹⁷

Mr. Vyshinsky attempted precisely the same maneuver when the First Committee of the General Assembly began discussion of the Korean problem on September 30, 1950, when he sought immediately after the organization of the Committee to introduce the subject of death sentences and executions, remarking that on September 28 his delegation had transmitted to the President of the General Assembly two communications concerning "11 Greek patriots and 8 trade union workers who had been sentenced to death."¹⁸

Following a point of order by Mr. Politis

¹⁴ U.N. doc. S/1746/Rev. 1. See also *U.N. Security Council Official Records*, Fifth Year, 493rd Meeting: 31 August 1950, No. 35, pp. 14-20.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* For French and Yugoslav statements, see *Ibid.* pp. 28-29. For Greek communications, see S/1749.

¹⁸ U.N. doc. A/C. 561.

(Greece), Mr. Vyshinsky continued on the theme of the "ceaseless terror" in Greece and urged, in accordance with the alleged precedents of 1948 and 1949, that a resolution be adopted requesting the President to negotiate with the representatives of the Greek Government for a repeal of the death sentence imposed on the Greek patriots.¹⁹

Mr. Politis denounced Mr. Vyshinsky's tactics, and Mr. Romulo (Philippines) proposed that the discussion of the Korean question begin immediately although the members of the Soviet bloc sought to hamper the debate by continuing to refer to the alleged executions; nevertheless, the Committee decided by a vote of 46-0 to discuss the Korean problem.²⁰

III. THE GREEK CASE IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE

The General Debate

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONTINUATION OF UNSCOP

The general discussion of the Greek question in the First Committee consumed only seven meetings, from November 10-15. Before the Committee was the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans which, among other things, had recommended that the General Assembly²¹—

consider the advisability of maintaining an appropriate United Nations agency on the Balkans, in the light of the current international situation and of conditions prevailing along the northern frontiers of Greece.

Sir Frank Soskice (U.K.) opened the discussion and, after briefly noting the long history of the question, declared that the General Assembly was faced with the three problems: the future of the Special Committee, the repatriation of Greek military personnel captured in the course of hostilities and illegally detained in the countries to the north of Greece, and the repatriation of Greek children. Concerning the continuation of the Special Committee, Sir Frank stated:²²

It would in the view of the United Kingdom delegation be sadly premature to proceed on the assumption that we have seen the last of armed conflict on or near the northern frontiers of Greece. We have to rejoice to note the very marked improvement which has become manifest since the victory of the Greek Army in 1949. . . . There are undoubtedly, both inside and outside Greece, many who are watching for the moment to renew the fight in which they have become temporarily worsted. It is essential that the Greek people should remain vigilant and . . . it

¹⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR. 346, pp. 3-4; A/C.1/159.

²⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR. 346, pp. 4-5. Mr. Vyshinsky also sought privately to get his resolution approved prior to the discussion of the Greek case in the Committee. For another reference to the Greek problem prior to the discussion in the First Committee, see the remarks of Mr. Cassimatis on Oct. 25, 1950, in connection with the Soviet draft resolution on "peace" (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR. 374, pp. 183-4).

²¹ U.N. doc. A/1307, ch. VI.

²² U.N. doc. A/C.1/PV.392; SR. 392, p. 297.

is equally essential that the United Nations Organization should not cease through its proper representatives to carry on the work of observation and conciliation which has hitherto been performed by the Special Committee.

Sir Frank introduced the draft resolution co-sponsored by the delegations of Australia, France, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States,²³ which approved the report of the Special Committee and noted a certain improvement in the situation along the northern Greek frontiers. The resolution, nevertheless, declared that a "threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" remained, and it continued the Special Committee in being—

until the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of reference and administrative arrangements contained in General Assembly resolutions 109 (II), 193 (III) and 288 (IV), unless meanwhile the Special Committee recommends to the Interim Committee its own dissolution.

The Interim Committee was authorized to act on such recommendation as it thought proper.

Although in Sir Frank's view it was not possible to forecast how long the Special Committee might necessarily remain in being, it might be possible to reduce its activities and to operate with fewer observers. If conditions of "complete tranquility" should prevail before the sixth session, it would "obviously be unnecessary to maintain the Special Committee in being and to continue to have its Observers on the spot." In any case, the draft resolution, in his view, had been framed to provide a procedure "which could be as elastic and adaptable as possible" in order to cope with the future, which was "wrapped in uncertainty."

Before Jean Politis, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece, could continue the debate, Mr. Katz-Suchy raised a point of order to permit circulation of Communist charges concerning the alleged "ceaseless terror" and "mass executions" in Greece,²⁴ a matter on which the Soviet and Eastern European delegations had laid much stress. Mr. Politis, who paid tribute to the work of the Special Committee on the Balkans, in his first intervention,²⁵ especially emphasized the repatriation of Greek military personnel who had been captured by the Greek guerrillas and taken into the territories of the northern neighbors of Greece. He noted that the Legal Department of the United Nations Secretariat, which the Special Committee consulted, had held that the northern neighbors of Greece "were under international obligation to repatriate to Greece Greek military personnel held in those countries," and the Greek delegation introduced a draft resolution calling for their repatriation. Mr. Politis called attention to the continuing threat to Greece, especially since 15,000 combatants, "whose principal activity was still subver-

sive action against Greece," were still in the neighboring and certain other countries, and supported the continuation of the Special Committee.

Following a brief statement supporting the joint draft resolution by M. Plaisant (France), Benjamin V. Cohen spoke for the United States delegation.²⁶ Mr. Cohen also reviewed the history of the Greek case, stressing that there had been some progress in the problem because of a number of developments, the first of which were "the valiant efforts of the Greek people to defend their freedom and independence." The Yugoslav defection from the Cominform and the closure of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier constituted another element. Other factors were Anglo-American assistance to Greece and the efforts of the United Nations, as exemplified in the work of the Special Committee on the Balkans. Although the situation had improved, Mr. Cohen called attention to the continuance of the threat to Greece and the statement of the Free Greece radio, broadcasting from Rumania on August 29, 1950, that "the Democratic Army of Greece preserved the bulk of its forces and is simply standing to at present."

Mr. Cohen also noted that the United Nations had not been able to verify the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas who had fled into the territories of Greece's northern neighbors. He expressed the "deepest regret" that no progress had been reported on the repatriation of the Greek children. But the United States representative was particularly pleased—

... to note the announcement made on May 21, 1950, by the Greek and Yugoslav Governments that they had agreed to exchange ministers. We hope that this exchange will soon take place. With the exchange of diplomatic representatives, with the expressed willingness of Yugoslavia to begin the process of repatriation of Greek children, with the Yugoslav statement of November 7 that some 50 Greek soldiers were being returned to Greece, we should expect further improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations."

In supporting continuation of the Special Committee on the Balkans for another year, unless the Special Committee could conclude its work earlier, Mr. Cohen declared:

It is the thought of the United States delegation that it might be found desirable to continue the observation function of the Special Committee in a limited way even after the Committee's dissolution. To meet such a situation the Interim Committee should be able to arrange for the observation function to be continued to the extent necessary, with the observers still in the area reporting to the Peace Observation Commission instead of to the Special Committee. It is our understanding that the

²³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/OV.392; A/C.1/SR.292, pp. 298-299.

²⁴ On Nov. 28, 1950, it was announced that full diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia had been restored. On Jan. 24, 1951, it was stated that a Greek delegation had arrived in Belgrade for discussions on the resumption of railway traffic between the two countries. On Feb. 2, 1951, a protocol establishing postal, telegraph, and telephone service between Greece and Yugoslavia was signed in Athens. On Feb. 12, Yugoslavia and Greece signed an agreement to establish rail service between the two countries to be effective on Feb. 15.

²⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/622 and Rev. 1.

²⁶ U.N. docs. A/C.1/624, 625, 626 and Adds. 1-4.

²⁷ U.N. docs. A/C.1/SR.299, p. 298; A/620.

resolution on uniting for peace [A/1456 (A)] and the proposed resolution which has been circulated will permit the Interim Committee to make such arrangements if the Committee thinks them necessary and proper, when the dissolution of the Balkan Committee is effected.

Mr. Husian (Pakistan), who had cosponsored the resolution, expressed the hope that the Special Committee would continue until the sixth session and would "concentrate its efforts on the task of reconciliation and the establishment of normal international relations in that part of the world."²⁸ He, too, understood that the Special Committee might recommend its own earlier dissolution if conditions warranted.

THE SOVIET POSITION

The Soviet representative, S. K. Tsarapkin, followed Mr. Husian on November 11 and largely reiterated the Soviet thesis which had been expounded in 1947, 1948, and 1949.²⁹ In the first place, he asserted, the Greek question was included on the agenda merely in order "to continue the old British-American policy pursued at previous sessions of the General Assembly and designed to shift the blame for the abnormal situation in Greece to Greece's neighbours, Albania and Bulgaria." Secondly, the charges against Albania and Bulgaria "were simply falsehoods and distortions," the Special Committee having resorted "to the testimony of false witnesses, deserters, informers, agents provocateurs and renegades, against whom the Greek police had used the most inhuman methods." Far from contributing to a solution of the Greek problem, the Special Committee had only delayed the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria, on the other, and could not contribute to a "normal situation in Greece." Mr. Tsarapkin then charged that the Greek claim to Northern Epirus constituted "the main hurdle in the path of agreement" between Greece and Albania, while the claim to rectifications on the Thracian frontier with Bulgaria had injured Greek-Bulgarian relations.³⁰

Mr. Tsarapkin also attacked Anglo-American "intervention" in the internal affairs of Greece and then concentrated on the alleged "ceaseless terror" and "mass executions" in Greece, in line with the persistent and vicious Communist propaganda which the U.S.S.R. had carried on against that country; among other things, he charged that there were 29,000 political prisoners in Greece, with 2,800 condemned to death, and 59 new death sentences in August 1950.

In light of this alleged situation, Mr. Tsarapkin presented the Soviet draft resolution, supported by the Soviet bloc, which recommended:³¹

²⁸ UN doc. A/C.1/SR.393, p. 301.

²⁹ U.N. docs. A/C.1/PV.393; SR.393, pp. 301-303.

³⁰ For an account see H. N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, cited, p. 20.

³¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/623.

(a) The declaration of a general amnesty in Greece and the abolition of the concentration camp for Greek democrats;

(b) The holding of universal and free parliamentary elections on the basis of proportional representation;

(c) The cessation of military and political intervention in Greek affairs by the United States of America and the United Kingdom;

(d) The establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania, and also between Greece and Bulgaria;

(e) The dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

GREECE REJECTS SOVIET CHARGES

Mr. Politis moved immediately against the Soviet propaganda attacks. He pointed out that when Mr. Vyshinsky had introduced his draft resolution on September 30 concerning the repeal of alleged death sentences in Greece, the First Committee had agreed with his point of order.³² "On the pretext of humanitarian sentiments," the Soviet representative was now repeating "the same gratuitous accusations, which must be answered for the last time," although Mr. Politis wished to examine, not the substance, but the motives behind the Soviet charges, since the Greek people "could not permit the crimes of their accusers to be laid at their own feet without stating the facts as they were." Mr. Politis stated that the guerrillas in Greece, since December 1944, had "claimed 100,000 victims." Despite the Soviet charges, "no one had been executed in Greece since 1 October 1949, and it was marveled how Mr. Vyshinsky, who spoke of mass executions, had been able to fill the enormous gap between zero and infinity." Was the U.S.S.R. acting in good faith in these charges? Mr. Politis did not think so:

... Its sincerity was made difficult to believe in by its reintroduction of capital punishment at home 2 months after proposing, at the fourth session, the abolition of that penalty in Greece. The satellites had of course followed that example, but that had not prevented the representative of Poland from being indignant about the proceedings of Greek courts. He forgot that on 14 October and 2 November last, seven and four death sentences respectively had been handed down in his own country. In 1950, the year during which the Soviet group had denounced terrorism in Greece 15 times, there had been 36 executions in Poland and 226 death sentences for political offences. During the same period, 120 persons had been sentenced to death in the other satellite countries, and most of them had already been executed. Yet the figures which had reached the outside world gave only a feeble indication of what was going on behind the "iron curtain".

Mr. Politis went on to say that, although Greece had been obliged temporarily to employ rigorous measures, she had—

reverted to clemency as soon as the danger had become less acute. That clemency had even been made retroactive, and Greece was contemplating for the future new measures to enable even those whose errors had been the very gravest to rejoin the Greek family. The worst

³² U.N. docs. A/C.1/393, pp. 303-304; SR. 346, pp. 3-5; A/C.1/559.

service that could be rendered to those lost sheep would therefore be to make them the subject of a controversy which would inevitably hamper the adoption of humanitarian measures.

He wondered how long the First Committee would permit its patience to be abused by reckless and unfounded charges against Greece. Although the Greek delegation could "have invoked the clause on national sovereignty," it had "preferred a final frank and loyal explanation to any tortuous procedural method." Since it would, however,

be contrary to the Charter to permit the opening of a debate on the internal affairs of Greece before the First Committee, as though it were an appellate court or a council of state to which the sentences of Greek tribunals or Greek administrative acts were submitted, the Greek delegation requested the First Committee to proceed at once to the vote on the U.S.S.R. draft resolution (A/C.1/559). Only thus could the ground be cleared for the study of the problems forming the real objective of the deliberations of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Sarper (Turkey) joined in the rebuttal with a brief and pertinent statement supporting the continuation of the Special Committee on the Balkans because of the satellite behavior toward Greece, and he indicated that "recent events had unhappily taught Turkey that Bulgaria did not hesitate to take every occasion to create difficulties for its peaceful neighbours and to foment frontier incidents."³³ He also pointed to the detention of Greek military personnel and of Greek children. Ambassador Sarper utterly rejected the Soviet proposal regarding alleged Greek death sentences, which he found "incompatible with the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of a State," and doubted the competence of the First Committee to study it. Ambassador Sarper pointedly remarked that the Soviet proposal for an amnesty and "free elections" could "only be accepted by the delegation of Turkey, if applied to Bulgaria instead of Greece."

Sir Keith Officer (Australia) noted the Australian interest in Greece. In view of the continued threat to Greece, he considered maintenance of the Special Committee necessary, although³⁴—

that Committee should be empowered to recommend its own dissolution to the Interim Committee at the proper time. In that case, it might be desirable that certain observational functions should continue, and if so, they probably should be under the Peace Observation Committee set up under a resolution recently adopted by the General Assembly. [A/1456, Res. A].

The Australian delegation could not support the Soviet proposal, since the amnesty and "free elec-

³³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.393, p. 304. On Aug. 7, 1950, the Bulgarian Government notified the Turkish Government that within 3 months 250,000 Turkish-speaking citizens of Bulgaria would have to leave Bulgaria for Turkey, which situation caused considerable difficulty between the two Governments.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

tions" provisions "clearly violated the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of a State" in article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter.

Likewise, Mr. Van Glabbeke (Belgium) vigorously supported the continuation of the Special Committee and rejected the Soviet proposal, the object of which was mere propaganda.³⁵

Mr. Politis then requested that the Soviet proposal be put to the vote, and, after objections from the Soviet bloc, this action was taken with the result that the Soviet draft resolution as to the suspension of death sentences was rejected by 31-6-12.³⁶

POSITION OF SOVIET SATELLITES

The general debate then continued, with Mr. Pisek (Czechoslovakia) repeating the familiar Soviet ideas.³⁷ Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland) reiterated the thesis at greater length on November 13, stressing the alleged terror in Greece, as had been his custom in the past.³⁸ Supporting the Soviet proposal, he remarked that "the tragedy of Greece had become the tragedy of the United Nations because of previous United Nations action. Instead of acting for peace and security, the United Nations had protected interventionists, terror and persecution." Mr. Baranovsky (Ukrainian S.S.R.) simply repeated the story, referred to the "terror" in Greece, and touched on the problem of the repatriation of Greek children, who had been "cared for lovingly" in the countries of Eastern Europe, although he felt that they should be returned to their parents, provided their parents so desired and so stated in individual requests.³⁹ Mr. Kiselev (Byelorussia S.S.R.) spoke in identical terms, concluding that only the Soviet draft resolution offered any genuine prospect of solving the Greek problem.⁴⁰

SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF UNSCOP

Meanwhile, Ambassador Jooste (Union of South Africa), like Sir Keith Officer, protested against the insulting language which had been used concerning Greece and the Greek delegation and remarked that Greece "had been subjected to an unbridled attack" by the representative of Poland.⁴¹ He thought the United Nations deserved much credit for its accomplishments in Greece, praised Anglo-American assistance to

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306; U.N. doc. A/C.1/559. The Greek proposal to close the debate was adopted by 28-6-16. The Ukrainian proposal to suspend the meeting was rejected by 32-8-12.

³⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.393, p. 308.

³⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.394, pp. 309-312.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 313-315.

⁴⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.395, pp. 317-319.

⁴¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.394, pp. 312-313.

that country, and believed that the presence of the Special Committee had been helpful—

As long as the threat to Greece continued to be a menace to peace it was the duty of the United Nations to continue its efforts to remove that menace.

The South African delegation, therefore, strongly supported the recommendation that the Special Committee continue its work, since it had "acted as a powerful deterrent to the violators of Greek territory" and its maintenance would serve the cause of peace.

Ambassador Jooste suggested, however, that "those immediately concerned should consider the possibility of reducing the size of the Committee as and when that proved feasible." He also supported the Greek proposal for the return of Greek military personnel and "condemned without reservation" those responsible for the detention of the Greek children. Mr. Jooste rejected the Soviet proposal because "certain provisions therein rendered it inadmissible," in the light of article 2 (7) of the Charter, and specifically because the paragraph as to "free elections" not only dealt "with a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Greece" but also "cast unfounded doubts on previous elections in Greece, as well as on the constitutionality of the present Government of Greece." The attitude of the Soviet Union was "merely an attempt to misrepresent American and British assistance to the people of Greece."

Mr. De Souza Gomes (Brazil), who spoke on the afternoon of November 13, also supported continuation of UNSCOP and the Greek resolution on the repatriation of Greek military personnel.⁴² M. Plaisant, who regretted that "the tone of the debate had sunk so low that wild diatribes" had taken the place of argument, opposed the Soviet draft resolution because it "plainly constituted intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, in violation of the provisions of the Charter." He remarked that the First Committee⁴³—

could not set itself up as a court of appeal and determine the legality of sentences rendered by the Greek tribunals. Nor could it require a government to organize elections; that involved the exercise of a sovereign right. Still less was it conceivable that the Committee should go so far as to propose that the elections should be conducted by a particular method.

In M. Plaisant's view, the desirability of continuing the Special Committee was not only implicit in its report and in the prevailing unrest in the Balkans but also—

in the violent diatribes exchanged during the discussion. It was therefore essential that an observation committee should be present in order to keep a watch in that part of the world and take the necessary action.

CLARIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN POSITION

Since there had been a number of "provocative and insulting charges recklessly leveled at the

⁴² U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.395, p. 317.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

United States" by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, Mr. Cohen intervened again in the discussion on November 13.⁴⁴

Repeating his statement during the 1949 session, Mr. Cohen remarked that the United States had come to the aid of the Greek Government and Greek people "to help them to retain their freedom." He reminded the Committee that American assistance to Greece, by act of Congress, was "conditioned on the continuing consent of the Greek Government" but was also⁴⁵—

subject to termination whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of American assistance unnecessary or undesirable. And what is more we have waived our right of veto should the matter come before the Security Council. I wonder whether the friendly aid the Soviet Union gives to the Cominform countries is so conditioned.

Mr. Cohen added that the United States had "no military base in Greece and seeks none." In conclusion, he said:

The United States is helping the Greeks to maintain their freedom—just as during World War II we helped the Soviet people to maintain their freedom. We lent-leased them aid in the amount of 11 billion dollars. We did not by aid enslave the Soviet peoples. We do not by our aid enslave the Greek people. America stands for freedom now as America fought for freedom for herself and all peoples during the last war. America will continue to aid those who wish to defend their freedom.

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GREECE

Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) repeated his earlier charges, accusing the Greek Government of expansionist claims against Albania; Mr. Politis once more counterattacked. He noted the ravages of war in Greece as a consequence of guerrilla warfare:⁴⁶

Those bands had ravaged more than 3,000 towns and villages, laid 40,000 mines of all kinds, carried off 1,500,000 head of cattle, set fire to 95,000 hectares of forest land, destroyed 915 bridges, derailed 307 trains, burnt down eight railway stations and destroyed 62,000 buildings. In commiserating the fate of the victims of those tragedies, the representative of Poland had omitted to point out that it was his own country, together with certain others, which was the source of their distress.

Emphasizing the fraudulent character of the charges against Greece, Mr. Politis pointed that in Czechoslovakia, for example, there were "180,000 persons interned in fifty-seven labour camps." As to the Soviet charges concerning Greek territorial claims, Mr. Politis said:⁴⁷

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319; PV. 395.

⁴⁵ See also, the statement of John Foster Dulles in the First Committee on Nov. 6, 1948, cited in H. N. Howard's, *The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly*, p. 576; Mr. Cohen's statement on Oct. 31, 1949, in *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*, cited, p. 19.

⁴⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.395, pp. 319-320; 320-322.

⁴⁷ For report of the Conciliation Committee, Oct. 22, 1949, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/506; textually contained in H. N. Howard, *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*, cited, pp. 24-27. The Communist-dominated EAM supported the Greek claims to

It was strange that the U.S.S.R. should accuse Greece of expansionist views with regard to Albania and Bulgaria, for at the Peace Conference held at Paris in 1946 it had been the U.S.S.R. which had asked for the legalization of the annexation of the Baltic states, a slice of Poland and portions of Finland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. As for Greece, it had respected the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria concluded at Paris on 10 February 1947, whereas Bulgaria had pursued an aggressive policy both before and after the signature of the Treaty. At that time Greece had advanced certain proposals which would have made it possible to resume diplomatic relations—respect for the provisions of the Peace Treaty, maintenance of the territorial *status quo* and the cessation of all aid to partisans. But Bulgaria had not accepted those reasonable proposals, and the negotiations had failed. In 1948 and 1949, Greece had accepted the proposals of two Conciliation Committees, established by the First Committee, and again Bulgaria had rejected them, demanding in its turn that the partisans should be allowed the right of belligerency, that a general amnesty should be declared in Greece and that elections should take place under the control of foreign powers, including the U.S.S.R. Such demands once more revealed the intention of the U.S.S.R. and its protégés to intervene in the domestic affairs of Greece. . . .

Mr. Politis also referred to the elections of March 5, 1950, and, concerning Anglo-American assistance to Greece, remarked that—

the assistance at present being provided by the United States was calculated to restore the country's economy, which had been destroyed first by the Hitlerite occupation and then by partisans assisted by neighbouring states.

Nevertheless, Mr. Katz-Suchy reverted to charges as to the "terror" in Greece, the Greek claims with regard to Northern Epirus, and the existence of a state of war with Albania; he urged support of the Soviet proposal.⁴⁸

Conclusion of General Debate and Decisions of the Committee

By November 14, the First Committee was ready to vote on the question of the continuation of the Special Committee on the Balkans, although a few more statements were to be heard. Mr. Van Glabbeke (Belgium) once more deplored the position of the Soviet bloc particularly with respect to the repatriation of Greek children.⁴⁹ Similarly, Deneke Sigui (El Salvador) supported continuation of the Special Committee.⁵⁰ Of particular interest was the statement of Mr. Rafael⁵¹ (Israel), who noted the improvement in the situation along the northern Greek frontiers, reviewed the work of the Conciliation Committee in 1949, and remarked that the Israeli delegation "wholeheartedly supported all the constructive recommendations" made by the Special Committee on the Balkans. The Israeli delegation

Northern Epirus and rectifications on the Bulgarian frontier at the Paris Peace Conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers in July and November 1946, and also boasted of its claim to Turkish Thrace. See U.N. doc. S/AC.4/56, p. 4; annex No. 29, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.395, p. 322.

⁴⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.396, pp. 323-324.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

hoped that during 1951 the Special Committee "would devote all its efforts to assist the parties to restore good-neighbourly relations." It was also confident that the Special Committee "would not hesitate to recommend its own dissolution as soon as it had achieved its task or when it believed that it had outlived its usefulness."

The Israeli delegation supported the Greek draft resolution for the repatriation of Greek military personnel and also the draft resolution concerning the repatriation of Greek children. Mr. Rafael remarked—

that for the sake of those innocent children and for the sake of the moral reputation of the United Nations, every effort should be made to remedy that sad situation.

Mr. Tsarapkin, (U.S.S.R.) then made an additional statement, reiterating the Soviet position, centering this time on the work of the Conciliation Committee in October 1949, and remarking that the Committee had recommended that Albania and Greece⁵²—

should agree not to resort to the threat or use of force to change the borders dividing Albania and Greece. Moreover, the Greek representative had contended that his government had accepted that proposal while the Albanian Government had not. . . . But since Greece had always coveted the southern part of Albania, it was natural that the Conciliation Committee's formula should not satisfy the Albanian Government. If Greece had no such designs on Northern Epirus that formula would be quite adequate and would be quite acceptable to Albania.

The Soviet representative inquired whether Greece considered the frontiers to be final and declared that "only a clear and affirmative reply to such a question could remove one of the grave obstacles in the way of reaching a settlement of the problem."

The First Committee, following a brief prior discussion, thereupon approved the draft resolution on the repatriation of detained Greek military personnel by a vote of 53-5-1 (Yugoslavia) and then adopted the joint draft resolution continuing the Special Committee on the Balkans in being, by a vote of 52-6. The Soviet draft resolution, on the other hand, was rejected by 51-5-2.⁵³

QUESTION OF REPATRIATION OF GREEK CHILDREN

The question of the repatriation of Greek children was now discussed in detail, although there had been general reference to the matter during the course of the general debate. The First Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General and of the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies concerning this humanitarian problem.⁵⁴ It also had the recommendation of the Special Committee on the Balkans that the General Assembly, "in a humani-

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁵⁴ U.N. doc. A/1480.

tarian spirit, detached from political or ideological considerations, make every possible effort to find some means of restoring the Greek children to their homes."⁵⁵

The Red Cross report pointed out that there had "in fact been little or no improvement" in the situation as to repatriation of the Greek children since October 1949 and that, with the exception of Yugoslavia, there had been no genuine cooperation on the part of any of the receiving countries. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies deeply regretted that, after repeated attempts, more substantial results had not been obtained and expressed the view that it was "now impossible for them to proceed further with the general execution of their mission through the channels open to them." Indeed, the Red Cross organizations felt compelled to state that⁵⁶—

they will be obliged to consider relinquishing the mission they accepted from the United Nations if the latter, and the countries concerned in the problem of displaced Greek children, do not afford them their assistance without which the task cannot be accomplished and which the United Nations General Assembly specifically called for in paragraph 2 of the operational part of its resolution of 18 November 1949 which, unfortunately, has not yet been applied in practice.

The Secretary-General reported similarly:⁵⁷

... At the moment of writing, not a single Greek child has yet been returned to his native land and, except for Yugoslavia, no country harbouring Greek children has taken definite action to comply with the resolutions unanimously adopted in two successive years by the General Assembly. The Secretary-General cannot but feel that the General Assembly must take a most serious view of this situation and will wish to urge once again, in the name of common humanity, that the children be returned without further procrastination and delay...

Mr. Lie added that the task could not be accomplished "without the genuine cooperation of the Governments concerned" and he hoped that such cooperation would be forthcoming.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

Sir Keith Officer (Australia) opened the discussion of the repatriation of the Greek children on November 14.⁵⁸ He thought the problem a "very simple matter and one about which all should be able to agree" and noted "the fundamental right and need of a child to be with his parents in the atmosphere of his own home."

Sir Keith considered the reports of the Secretary-General and the International Red Cross very depressing, except for the fact that the Yugoslav Government had arranged for sending 17 children to Australia and was making arrangements for sending an additional 62 children to Australia to their parents. He also noted that

"practical arrangements" were being made by the Greek and Yugoslav Red Cross societies, with the assistance of the International Red Cross, to repatriate a first group of 63 children to Greece and that the Yugoslav Government, in principle, had agreed to a visit by the Red Cross so that the lists of children thought to be in Yugoslavia could be checked. On the debit side, however, Sir Keith pointed to the general failure to live up to the resolutions concerning the Greek children and particularly to the failure of Eastern European governments to cooperate with the Red Cross. Sir Keith found it difficult to understand—

how governments on the one hand continue to announce their agreement in principle to the return of the Greek children to their homes and on the other refuse to cooperate in any way with the Red Cross and other interested bodies in carrying out the preliminary work necessary for this purpose.

Because of strong feelings concerning the matter, the Australian delegation had joined with those of Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, in sponsoring a resolution concerning the repatriation of the Greek children.⁵⁹ This resolution essentially:

1. Requested the Secretary-General and the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their efforts toward the repatriation of the Greek children;

2. urged all states harboring the Greek children to make all the necessary arrangements, in cooperation with the Secretary-General and the International Red Cross, for the early return of the Greek children to their parents, "and whenever necessary, to allow the International Red Cross organizations free access to their territories for this purpose;

3. established a Standing Committee, composed of the representatives of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden, to consult with the Secretary-General and the representatives of the states concerned with a view to the early repatriation of the children;

4. requested the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to cooperate with this Committee; and,

5. requested the Secretary-General to report from time to time to Member States on the implementation of the resolution, to the International Red Cross organizations, and to the Secretary-General to submit reports to the sixth session of the General Assembly.

Sir Keith hoped that the establishment of the Standing Committee and the endorsement of the resolution would "provide the machinery and the atmosphere necessary to bring about the accomplishment of the United Nations aims which have been set out in the two previous resolutions and are again contained in the present resolution. . . ."

Miss Bernardino (Dominican Republic) spoke movingly in behalf of this resolution which was quickly denounced by Mr. Pisek (Czechoslovakia).⁶⁰ Mr. Pisek asserted that Czechoslovakia had cooperated fully with the Red Cross, although this assertion was hardly supported by the report of the Red Cross, even if no children had been returned to Greece, because "of the lack of evidence

⁵⁵ U.N. doc. A/1307, p. 28.

⁵⁶ U.N. doc. A/1480, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/PV. 396; SR. 396, pp. 326-327.

⁵⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/627.

⁶⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.396, pp. 327-328.

on the authenticity of the lists submitted and of the documents related thereto." The responsibility for any delay "should be laid at the door of the Greek Government, whose aims were not always pursued for humanitarian reasons." Mr. Pisek, moreover, expressed the fear that the Greek Government would not send the children to their homes but to a camp.

The debate continued on the afternoon of November 14, with statements from Mr. von Balluseck (Netherlands) and M. Plaisant (France) both of whom were cosponsoring the resolution.⁶¹ Of special interest, however, was the statement of Mr. Vilfan (Yugoslavia).⁶² Mr. Vilfan pointed out some of the complexities of the problem from his point of view, noting that there were 2,000 children in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Albania, and even Greece, whose parents were now in Yugoslavia. He also indicated that—

in May 1950 the Yugoslav Red Cross had published a report which stated that Yugoslavia had provided asylum for 9,506 Greek children, 7,812 of whom had lived with their parents or relatives and 1,694 in Red Cross homes. The children had received the greatest care; they attended school and received instruction in their mother tongue. At the same time, it was true that such care could not replace the love of parents. The Yugoslav Red Cross had therefore made every effort to carry out the General Assembly resolutions of 1948 and 1949 . . . while at the same time stipulating essential guarantees. It had noted, for example, that the lists of children submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross had contained errors. Out of 174 Greek children that it had been possible to identify, it had been found that the parents of twelve were not in Greece but in Yugoslavia. . . .

There were difficulties in checking lists and in administrative complications of one kind or another, and the "political atmosphere was not yet such as to preclude the possibility of the misuse of lists of children published by the country of asylum." The Yugoslav Red Cross had so far acted upon the parents' signed requests for the return of their children, and 68 children were sent to their parents in Australia. Arrangements had now been made with the Greek Red Cross, "and plans had been made for the departure of an initial group of 63 children." Mr. Vilfan concluded:

The Yugoslav Government hoped that those initial steps towards the repatriation of Greek children would make the final settlement of the problem possible. In that connection, he paid a tribute to the Swedish Red Cross for its offer of good offices. Nevertheless, the problem of the repatriation of children would not be fully solved until the Greek children outside Yugoslavia had been restored to their parents in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav children who had been outside their country since the war had been enabled to return home.

Likewise of interest was the statement of Mrs. Begtrup (Denmark) who spoke with great feeling about the Greek children, in view of her ex-

perience in the postwar era with similar problems.⁶³ Although the harboring countries had asked for guaranties with respect to the fate of the children, once they had been returned to Greece, Mrs. Begtrup pointed out that the International Red Cross had been asked "to make an investigation, to perform the necessary formalities and to ascertain the children's living conditions on their return to Greece." She also noted that, with the exception of Yugoslavia, no countries of Eastern Europe had responded, adding that "63 children were ready to leave Yugoslavia for their own country, and the Swedish Red Cross had been invited to help the Yugoslav Red Cross." On the other hand, "the International Red Cross had met with passive resistance on the part of certain countries." She hoped that the Standing Committee, composed of "neutral countries," would "make it possible to resolve the present difficulties," but, "failing that solution," she inquired "what the Soviet Union would suggest." Mrs. Begtrup concluded:

In spite of eloquent speeches, women, with their fine instinct for honesty, did not believe statements about human rights emanating from countries that were keeping children away from their parents. The United Nations and the countries which were sheltering Greek children had one last chance to dispel the mistrust of women and mothers throughout the world.

Sir Frank Soskice (U.K.) warmly supported the resolution,⁶⁴ pointing out that "whatever excuses diseased minds may conjure up for the nightmarish cruelties practiced in some countries on grown-ups, the most tortuous processes of the human intellect cannot possibly justify wholesale vengeance exacted from children." Nor could he justify the detention of the Greek children, whatever their care, since "their proper haven of refuge is in their own house with their own parents, not in forcible detention camps in strange lands." There could be "no hurt so deep which can be inflicted on human beings as those hurts inflicted upon them through their children." The United Kingdom delegation, therefore, hoped "that an end will soon be found for the agony of mind which these unhappy people must be undergoing."

Mr. Jarvie (Union of South Africa) sounded a similar note, pointing to Yugoslavia as an example that "a little good will would make it possible to achieve some progress."⁶⁵

Mr. Politis, who continued the discussion for the Greek delegation, replied to various charges which had been made, especially by the Czechoslovak representative, noted that the difficulties which had been mentioned by the Yugoslav representative, had "merely underlined the necessity for cooperation which, in the case of Greece and Yugoslavia, should lead to a settlement of the

⁶¹ U. N. doc. A/C.1/SR.397, pp. 329-330.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 331: PV. 397.

⁶⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.397, p. 331.

question."⁶⁸ He added that certain results had been achieved—

in the particular case of Yugoslavia, but other countries had either made promises and not kept them or had ignored the invitations of the League of Red Cross Societies and of the Secretary-General or else had stated that there were no Greek children in their territories.⁶⁹

Mr. Soto (Chile) felt that the return of the children to their homes was not merely a moral and social problem but rather "a duty for civilized countries." He could, of course, find no justification for their detention for "political reasons" and hoped that some solution could be found.⁶⁸

Since the problem had been mentioned in his opening remarks, Mr. Cohen, (U.S.) dealt only briefly with the question.⁶⁹ Supporting the joint resolution, he said:

If we want peace in this world we must show our ability to rise above ideological differences and to find in our common humanity a basis on which to build tolerance and understanding. Let us make an honest effort to do so now. Let us forget our recriminations and counter-recriminations and act on the basis of our common humanity. Let us solve the problem of the Greek children as humanity demands that it shall be solved. Let us all work without excuse of recrimination to return the Greek children to their parents.

Before the meeting adjourned for the afternoon, Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) indicated that it was premature to close the discussion, since there was "a whole series of proposals for the amendment of the draft resolution."⁷⁰ That turned out to be true, when the First Committee met on the morning of November 15, Mr. Tsarapkin spoke again at length.⁷¹ He repeated previous charges concerning the Greek position in the repatriation of the Greek children. Remarking that the countries "sheltering" the Greek children "actually deserved the gratitude of the United Nations," in the interest of "unanimity," Mr. Tsarapkin offered a number of amendments. He proposed deletion of references to the Secretary-General and the Red Cross, elimination of the reference to access of the International Red Cross to the territories of the harboring states, and deletion of the references to a Standing Committee.⁷²

Sir Keith Officer, who indicated that the repre-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 331-332.

⁶⁹ Twenty-one Greek children were repatriated from Yugoslavia at Evzoni on Nov. 25, 1950, and the names of 111 children had been sent to Geneva. A representative of the Swedish Red Cross, Prof. Erik J. Holmberg, visited Yugoslavia in January 1951 in the interest of further repatriation of the Greek children. See especially U.N. docs. A/AC.16/INF. 25/Rev. 1; A/AC.16/0/G-Y/14 and Concl. On Feb. 8, 1951, the Standing Committee, composed of the representatives of Peru, the Philippines and Sweden, met with the Secretary-General to consider the problem of the repatriation of the Greek children.

⁷⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.397, pp. 332-333.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁷³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.398, pp. 335-336.

⁷⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.1/028.

sentatives of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden would constitute the Standing Committee, in reply to questions which had been raised by Faris Bey El-Khoury (Syria) stated that "the proposed Committee did not entail any cost, since the intention was that it would meet in New York when the Secretary-General desired to consult it."⁷³ Sir Keith also stressed that the Special Committee on the Balkans could not very well serve in this capacity and urged acceptance of the joint resolution as it stood.

Both Mr. Van Glabbeke (Belgium) and Mr. Politis supported this position.⁷⁴ Mr. Politis thought it curious that the Soviet representative should make charges that Greece was exploiting the problem of the children for political reasons, when the Czechoslovak representative "had indicated that his government subordinated the question of returning the children to the question of the establishment in Greece of a regime" of which he could approve. Mr. Politis stated:

The Government of Greece did not wish children to be separated from their parents but restored to them. To that end, it asked for cooperation and good faith. The Greek Government did not plan to lodge the children in camps but to send them to their parents. . . .

That cooperation was possible was clear from the action of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government had made conditions, some of which seemed excessive, but they had been accepted by Greece. There could be no objections to cooperation except a desire to obstruct. If the government concerned chose not to trust Greece, the Red Cross or the United Nations could handle the matter. The Greek Government was prepared to discuss conditions: all that was required was a little good will.

DECISION OF COMMITTEE ON GREEK CHILDREN

The First Committee was now moving toward a vote on the question, although before doing so, Mr. Katz-Suchy, (Poland), repeated the usual charges and made the usual denials; criticized the reports of the Secretary-General, the International Red Cross, and the Special Committee; urged the necessity of unanimity in supporting the Soviet amendments; and remarked:⁷⁵

At the present time, the children in exile were being brought up in ideal conditions. They were being educated in a spirit of patriotism to admire the great traditions of Greece. Their happy situation had been confirmed by the reports of various visitors, journalists, and representatives of humanitarian organizations.

Closure of debate, proposed by the Chairman, was approved by 18-0-7, and the Committee prepared to vote. Mr. Katz-Suchy, in the interest of "unanimity," urged that the vote be postponed until the afternoon, since the delay "might enable the sponsors of the joint draft to accept the amendments submitted by the U.S.S.R."⁷⁶ But Sir

⁷⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.397, p. 332; SR.398, p. 337.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 337-338.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-339.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

Keith Officer and Mr. Luns (Netherlands) stated that "they could not accept the amendments."⁷⁷

In the end, the Soviet amendments were rejected respectively by votes of 43-5-5, 46-5-7, and 44-5-8. The joint draft resolution was approved as a whole by a vote of 53-0-5, the operating paragraph 5 being approved unanimously.⁷⁸

IV. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Following adoption of the resolutions in the Greek case, the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Entezam, on November 21, referred the question of financial and budgetary considerations to the Fifth Committee.⁷⁹ Already, on November 20, the Secretary-General had estimated a budget of \$573,600 for the continuation of the Special Committee during 1951, which included provision for 27 persons detailed from headquarters and 8 internationally recruited staff.⁸⁰ The estimate for assisting in the repatriation of the Greek children, filed on November 21, was placed at \$50,000.⁸¹ In the report to the Fifth Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted the estimated expenditure as compared with that of \$780,200 for 1950. The Advisory Committee recommended a number of reductions in expenditure, including the elimination of alternate representatives and of the deputy principal secretary after a period of 3 months, and the reduction in the number of observers, which totaled 27. All told a reduction of \$48,600 was recommended, but the figure of \$50,000 for the repatriation of the Greek children, was retained.⁸²

The Fifth Committee considered the problem on November 28.⁸³ During the course of the discussion, a number of delegations indicated the importance of making reductions in expenditures, especially on the number of observers and auxiliary personnel and alternate representatives, the final decision to be left to the Special Committee. The representatives of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and the Ukrainian S.S.R. objected to the appropriation for the purposes of the resolution, for reasons already stated in the First Committee. In the end, the estimate for the Special Committee was placed at \$525,000, and the resolution was passed by 27-6-0. On the other hand, the estimate of \$50,000 for the repatriation of Greek children was approved unanimously.⁸⁴

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

⁷⁸ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁹ U.N. doc. A/1536, A/C.5/416.

⁸⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.5/413.

⁸¹ U.N. doc. A/C.5/414.

⁸² U.N. doc. A/1555.

⁸³ U.N. doc. A/C.5/SR.270, pp. 15-18.

⁸⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.5/L.91.

V. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS

Even before the plenary session of the General Assembly was prepared to vote on the Greek question, the Soviet and Polish delegations once more circulated materials concerning the alleged "terror" in Greece, charging that 30,000 "innocent Greeks" had been "doomed to certain death." Mr. Kyrrou (Greece), replied on November 28 with a statement that "the Soviet Government stands behind every subversive movement in Greece."⁸⁵

When the question came before the plenary session on December 1, 1950, it was agreed that there should be no discussion, because of the ample discussion in the First Committee, although that stand did not prevent extensive remarks in explanation of votes, prior to the formal vote itself.⁸⁶ In explanation of the Soviet position, for example, Mr. Tsarapkin repeated the arguments made in the First Committee:⁸⁷

The experience of the last few years has shown that Anglo-American proposals cannot serve as a basis for settlement of the Greek question, since they are based on false charges unsubstantiated by the evidence obtained and by alleged threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece originating from Albania, Bulgaria and Romania and do not contribute to the normalization of the situation in Greece. The Soviet Union delegation, therefore, calls on the General Assembly to reject the Anglo-American draft resolution which is not based on facts representing the true state of the situation in Greece.

Only the Soviet draft resolution, rejected by the First Committee, offered any hope of a solution. These sentiments were reechoed by Mr. Udovichenko (Ukrainian S.S.R.), while Mr. Kiselev (Byelorussia S.S.R.) simply endorsed them.⁸⁸

Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand), who had not spoken in the First Committee, paid tribute to Greece and her people, endorsed the resolution on the continuation of the Special Committee on the Balkans, and spoke in behalf of the repatriation of detained Greek military personnel and the Greek children.⁸⁹ Mr. Pisek (Czechoslovakia) once more reiterated the theme of "terrorism," only to be outdone in this respect by Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland), who heaped his previous denunciations of the Special Committee on the Balkans and praised the Soviet proposals.⁹⁰ The head of the Greek delegation, Mr. Kanellopoulos, summarized the Greek position, once more calling attention to the general improvement of the situation along the northern Greek frontiers, but pointing to the dangers across the frontier, and urged continuation of the Special Committee.⁹¹ Mr.

⁸⁵ U.N. doc. A/1558.

⁸⁶ U.N. doc. A/PV.313, p. 5.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19, 25-30.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-25.

Van Glabbeke (Belgium) then closed the discussion.⁹²

In the ensuing vote, the Greek resolution on the repatriation of Greek military personnel was approved by 53-6-0, and that on the continuation of the Special Committee by 53-6-0. The resolution was approved by 50-0-5, the Soviet amendments being rejected by votes of 49-5-1, 48-5-2, 51-5-1. The Soviet proposal of an amnesty "free elections," cessation of Anglo-American "military and political intervention" in Greece, and the dissolution of the Special Committee on the Balkans was rejected by a vote of 50-5-3, and that on the repeal of death sentences by 38-6-11.⁹³

On December 1, 1950, by an even stronger vote than that in years past, the General Assembly on the basis of the recommendation of the Special Committee on the Balkans decided to maintain vigilance on the northern frontiers of Greece.

STATEMENTS BY BENJAMIN V. COHEN ALTERNATE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY"

November 10, 1950

Once more the members of this Committee are confronted with the question of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece," with particular reference to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. As this is the fourth time that this Committee has dealt with the question, we have all become, as I remarked last year, experts on the Greek question.

It will be recalled that the Security Council first had its attention drawn to the problem in December 1946 and established a Commission of Investigation for the purpose of examining the situation along the northern frontiers of Greece. The Commission reported in May 1947 that the northern neighbors of Greece had assisted the Communist guerrillas in their attempt to overthrow by force the constitutional Government of Greece. The Security Council was unable to reach any decision concerning the threat to Greece because of lack of unanimity among its permanent members. The problem was, therefore, placed on the agenda of the second regular session of the General Assembly.

On October 21, 1947, the General Assembly established the Special Committee on the Balkans which has been functioning under the direction of the General Assembly during the last 3 years. It is not necessary to review here all the difficulties which the Committee encountered in the past in carrying out its work. Despite these difficulties, each year the Committee has been able to report progress.

Progress has been due to a number of factors. First among these, we must list the valiant efforts of the Greek people to defend their freedom and independence. Second among these factors, we must note the increased respect shown by Yugoslavia for the Assembly's recommendations since the withdrawal or expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34; U.N. docs. A/1560, 1569, 1584.

⁹⁴ Made in Committee I on Nov. 10, 13, and 14, respectively, and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

But not an insignificant factor have been the efforts of the United Nations, the work of the Special Committee and the affirmative assistance given to Greece by the United States and other members of the United Nations in support of the Assembly's resolutions.

Regarding the work of the Special Committee, the Secretary-General, in his last annual report, lists among the major acts of the United Nations during the past year which have been of constructive benefit to the world:

"The progressive pacification of the northern borders of Greece after 3 years during which the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and its predecessor performed a useful and necessary observer role, although unable to secure a settlement of outstanding disputes between Greece and her northern neighbors."

The present situation is presented to us in the unanimous report of the Special Committee. The report discloses continuing improvement along the northern borders of Greece. It shows that, with the elimination of large-scale guerrilla activity, the threat to Greece has been altered in character but not entirely eliminated. The report reveals that while Yugoslavia had closed its frontiers as early as July 10, 1949, Albania and Bulgaria, which are members of the Cominform, have not ceased their moral and material aid to the Greek guerrillas, and the danger of a renewal by them of more active support of the guerrillas is still present. As the Special Committee points out:

"... Instead of an active support of guerrilla fighting, Albanian and Bulgarian actions have tended more and more to take the form of: (1) support of the retreat from Greece of scattered groups of guerrillas; (2) the harbouring of Greek guerrillas in a manner contrary to the resolution of the General Assembly which called for international verification of their disarming and disposition; and (3) a continuing demonstration of unfriendliness, and even hostility, marked by a series of largely minor frontier incidents. At the same time, it would appear that external support of the remaining guerrilla activity within Greece has not ceased. This activity, which has been concentrated mainly in the area of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, has consisted of minor raids, sabotage, propaganda, and contact work in the villages. As regards the position of the Greek guerrillas outside Greece, the Special Committee has kept in mind the announcement of the "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece" of 15 October 1949, after the defeat of the Greek guerrillas by the Greek National Army, that "the Democratic Army has not laid down its arms, it has only put them aside." It has also noted the reported statement of Nicholas Zachariadis, Secretary-General of the Greek Communist Party, that a "revolutionary" situation still obtained in Greece, and that of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party on 26 April 1950, of similar import. Of particular interest to the Special Committee was the reported statement of Dimitrios Vlantas at the seventh plenary session of the Greek Communist Party, in June 1950, that the main forces of the "Democratic Army of Greece" continue to exist."

In this connection, it is of interest to note that the so-called "Free Greece" radio, which broadcasts from Rumanian territory, declared on August 29, 1950, the first anniversary of the defeat of the Greek guerrillas in the battle of Grammos:

"The Democratic Army of Greece was defeated in that battle, but it was far from annihilated. The Democratic Army of Greece preserved the bulk of the forces and is simply standing to at present."

The report of the Special Committee also directs our attention to the problems yet to be solved in order to restore normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbors. The report states:

"Among the problems still remaining, the urgent solution of which constitutes a prerequisite for the restoration of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbors are: international verification of the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas outside Greece; the repatriation of Greek children—a problem which has done

much to perpetuate bad relations between Greece and its northern neighbors; the repatriation of detained Greek soldiers and other Greek nationals; and conclusion of conventions for the regulation and control of the common frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbors. Only when these problems have been solved, in compliance with the General Assembly's recommendations, will conditions in the Balkans be such as to permit the reestablishment of normal relations between the four Governments."

The report of the Special Committee shows that, despite the Assembly's recommendation, the northern neighbors of Greece have failed to permit the international verification of the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas who have fled into their territories. The Special Committee concludes, moreover, that conditions in Greece would now "facilitate the peaceful repatriation to Greece of those Greek nationals who desire to return to her in accordance with the law of the land." But so far little or no progress in this direction has been made.

With regard to the repatriation of approximately 1,300 Greek soldiers captured by the guerrillas and removed to the territories of Greece's northern neighbors, the Special Committee states:

"Despite repeated requests by the Government of Greece, and in violation of international practice, no list of these prisoners has been circulated by the Governments concerned and all efforts made by the Special Committee to assist in their repatriation have proved futile."

The United States notes particularly, and with the deepest regret, that, despite the two unanimously adopted resolutions of the General Assembly on the repatriation of Greek children, the Special Committee is unable to report any substantial progress. The United States shares, as it hopes all other members of the United Nations share, the concern that the Special Committee has expressed on this subject in the following terms:

"The Special Committee has viewed with the gravest concern the fact that no Greek children have yet been repatriated to their homes in Greece. The Special Committee has noted the definite proposals of the Yugoslav Government indicating that it intended to fulfill the terms of the resolution of the General Assembly regarding this question, and that 17 Greek children from Yugoslavia had been sent to their parents in Australia. But apart from this, the two unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly calling for the repatriation of the children removed from Greece during the course of the guerrilla warfare have had no practical results, despite the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the International Red Cross organizations. The failure of the states concerned to return these children to their homes has given rise to widespread indignation and sorrow. The basic failure to resolve this problem constitutes a continuing source of international friction, as well as a standing challenge to the United Nations and to the most elementary humanitarian principles.

Despite the lack of progress on the specific matters I have mentioned, and despite the slow progress made in the reestablishment of normal relations between the Governments directly concerned, the situation along the northern frontier of Greece has improved and appears to be improving. We were particularly pleased to note the announcement made on May 21, 1950, by the Greek and Yugoslav Governments that they had agreed to exchange ministers. We hope that this exchange will soon take place. With the exchange of diplomatic representatives, with the expressed willingness of Yugoslavia to begin the process of repatriation of Greek children, with the Yugoslav statement of November 7 that some 50 Greek soldiers were being returned to Greece, we should expect further improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations.

It is the hope of the United States that, if the situation along the northern frontier of Greece continues to improve, the Special Committee may be able to complete its assigned tasks, or at least the major portion of them, during the coming year.

The United States believes that the Assembly should approve the report of the Special Committee, continue in force the recommendations previously made, and continue the mandate of the Special Committee for another year unless the Special Committee finds it possible to wind up its work earlier.

It is the thought of the United States delegation that it might be found desirable to continue the observation function of the Special Committee in a limited way even after the Committee's dissolution. To meet such a situation, the Interim Committee should be able to arrange for the observation function to be continued to the extent necessary, with the observers still in the area reporting to the Peace Observation Commission instead of to the Special Committee. It is our understanding that the resolution on uniting for peace and the proposed resolution, which has been circulated, will permit the Interim Committee to make such arrangements if the Committee thinks them necessary and proper, when the dissolution of the Balkan Committee is effected.

That is all I have to say now, Mr. Chairman. I may possibly have further observations to make after hearing the views of the other members of our Committee.

November 13, 1950

I see no reason to prolong this debate to reply to the provocative and insulting charges recklessly leveled at the United States.

The United States came to the aid of the Greek Government and Greek people to help them to retain their freedom.

As I stated to this Committee last year:

"Our assistance to Greece by Act of Congress not only is conditioned on the continuing consent of the Greek Government but is subject to termination whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of American assistance unnecessary or undesirable. And what is more we have waived our right of veto should the matter come before the Security Council. I wonder whether the friendly aid the Soviet Union gives to the Cominform countries is so conditioned."

The Greek people are allowed to express their opinion about American aid without fear, and they do so. Such is not the lot of the Balkan people under the protection of Cominform advisers.

The United States has no military base in Greece and seeks none.

We do not say conditions in Greece are perfect. In few countries are conditions perfect. But we are helping to restore economic health to Greece. We are helping to heal the wounds left by a cruel civil war fomented by the Cominform countries.

We want tolerance and peace to prevail in Greece. We think the way to do so is to heal the wounds left by the civil war. Reopening those wounds, exciting hatred and division among the Greek people is not the way to encourage peace and tolerance in Greece.

Who is trying to light a powder keg to start a new world war? It is not the United States. It is those responsible for the blaring of radios outside of Greece that the Greek guerrillas—the Greek Democratic Army outside of Greece—is not disbanded but is standing ready to attack at the proper time.

We want to discontinue the Special Committee at the earliest possible moment but not at the expense of Greek independence.

If the Cominform delegations want the Special Committee discontinued, let them see that Greece's northern neighbors leave Greece in peace.

The United States is helping the Greeks to maintain their freedom—just as during World War II we helped the Soviet people to maintain their freedom. We lent them aid in the amount of 11 billion dollars. We did not by aid enslave the Soviet peoples. We do not by our aid enslave the Greek people. America stands for

freedom now as America fought for freedom for herself and all peoples during the last war. America will continue to aid those who wish to defend their freedom.

November 14, 1950

I do not intend to take the time of the Committee to speak at length upon the question of the repatriation of the Greek children. I have already briefly spoken on the subject in my first address. The Assembly has twice unanimously adopted resolutions on the matter. We have before us the reports of the Secretary-General and the Red Cross. What is required is action, not excuses and not recriminations. There may be difficulties and complications, but they can be overcome if there is a will to overcome them.

We are grateful to those who have raised their voices, and who will cast their votes and exert every action within their power, for the prompt return of the Greek children to their parents.

We are particularly grateful to the distinguished Australian delegate for his clear and objective statement of the essential facts and his moving appeal for action. We are also grateful to the distinguished delegates of Denmark and the Dominican Republic for speaking in behalf of the women of the civilized world. I need not reiterate what has already been said so eloquently here by preceding speakers.

The draft resolution, tabled by Australia, the Netherlands, and Peru, (which we wholeheartedly endorsed) calls for action free from all political and ideological considerations. The resolution urges the Secretary-General and the International Red Cross, with the Governments concerned and the support of a standing committee of the United Nations, to continue their efforts to facilitate the prompt return of these unfortunate children to their parents. For the benefit of the Czechoslovak delegate I would emphasize that the resolution calls for the return of the children to their parents. Surely this proposal, in line with past efforts of the United Nations, should command the support of all of us.

If we want peace in this world, we must show our ability to rise above ideological differences and to find in our common humanity a basis on which to build tolerance and understanding. Let us make an honest effort to do so now. Let us forget our recriminations and counter-recriminations and act on the basis of our common humanity. Let us solve the problem of the Greek children as humanity demands that it shall be solved. Let us all work without excuse or recrimination to return the Greek children to their parents.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON GREECE

U.N. doc. A/1584
Adopted Dec. 1, 1950

A.

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the unanimous conclusions of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans concerning those members of the Greek armed forces who were captured by the Greek guerrillas and taken into countries north of Greece,

HAVING NOTED that with the sole exception of Yugoslavia, the other States concerned are still detaining these members of the Greek armed forces without justification under commonly accepted international practice,

1. *Recommends* the repatriation of all those among them who express the wish to be repatriated,

2. *Calls upon* the States concerned to take the necessary measures for the speedy implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Instructs* the Secretary-General to request the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to ensure liaison with the national Red Cross organizations of the States concerned, with a view to implementing the present resolution.

B.

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and having noted that, although a certain improvement has taken place in the situation on the northern frontiers of Greece, there nevertheless remains a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece,

1. *Approves* the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans;

2. *Continues* the Special Committee in being until the sixth session of the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of reference and administrative arrangements contained in General Assembly resolutions 109 (II), 193 (III), and 288 (IV), unless meanwhile the Special Committee recommends to the Interim Committee its own dissolution;

3. *Authorizes* the Interim Committee to act on such recommendation as it thinks proper.

C.

The General Assembly,

NOTING with grave concern the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies and of the Secretary-General, and particularly the statement that "not a single Greek child has yet been returned to his native land and, except for Yugoslavia, no country harbouring Greek children has taken definite action to comply with the resolutions unanimously adopted in two successive years by the General Assembly,"

RECOGNIZING that every possible effort should be made to restore the children to their homes, in a humanitarian spirit detached from political or ideological considerations,

EXPRESSING its full appreciation of the efforts made by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies and by the Secretary-General to implement General Assembly resolutions 193 C (III) and 288 B (IV),

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their efforts in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions;

2. *Urges* all States harbouring the Greek children to make all the necessary arrangements, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the International Red Cross organizations, for the early return of the Greek children to their parents and, whenever necessary, to allow the international Red Cross organizations free access to their territories for this purpose;

3. *Establishes* a Standing Committee, to be composed of the representatives of Peru, the Philippines and Sweden, to act in consultation with the Secretary-General, and to consult with the representatives of the States concerned, with a view to the early repatriation of the children;

4. *Requests* the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to co-operate with the Standing Committee;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report from time to time to Member States on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution, and requests the international Red Cross organizations and the Secretary-General to submit reports to the General Assembly at its sixth session.

Indian Food Crisis—Opportunity To Combat Communist Imperialism

*The President's Message to the Congress*¹

I recommend that the Congress provide assistance to the Republic of India to meet the food crisis which now confronts the people of that country.

The people of India are in desperate need of emergency assistance from this country in meeting their food problems.

A series of natural disasters—earthquakes, floods, droughts, and plagues of locusts—greatly reduced the 1950 grain crop in India. The result has been to impair the ability of India to feed the population in its major cities and in many rural areas.

The average Indian food consumption is little more than half of our own. Grain constitutes more than three-quarters of the Indian diet. India has a large and effective rationing system, through which a large portion of the Indian population receives some or all of its necessary food grain supplies.

One hundred and twenty-five million people are covered by the rationing system. Some 45 million depend almost entirely upon their Government ration for their food grain supplies. Already the Government of India has found it necessary to cut the standard grain ration from 12 ounces to 9 ounces a day and take other drastic measures to meet the growing distress. Grain reserves have reached a dangerously low point.

Total grain requirements for ration distribution this year are estimated by the Government of India at about 9 million long tons or 336 million bushels. To maintain the rationing system, even at a level below last year's, the Government of India finds that it will have to import close to 6 million tons in 1951. India is procuring almost 4 million tons of this total through the use of its own foreign-exchange resources. This grain is to be purchased in Australia, Argentina, Burma and other countries. It includes about 1½ million tons of grain which India is procuring for cash from this country and Canada in accordance with its quotas under the International Wheat Agreement.

¹ H. Doc. 56, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

Procurement of the remaining 2 million tons—about 75 million bushels—which India estimates it will need, presents a serious problem. This grain will have to come in large measure, if not entirely, from this country. The Government of India has requested the United States to make this amount available, with shipment to begin as soon as possible. India finds that it does not now have funds available to pay for this amount, and yet, if action is not taken, there may be a real danger of famine in India.

We cannot turn a deaf ear to India's appeal. Our friendship for the people of India and our traditional concern for human suffering impel us to take every reasonable step we can to alleviate mass hunger and distress. Furthermore, the needs of the people of India have a special claim upon our sympathies at this time.

India is the largest of the new nations of Asia which have attained independence since the end of World War II. Following the voluntary withdrawal of the British in 1947, the Indian people adopted a constitution and began their existence under it, as a sovereign democratic republic, on January 26, 1950, little more than a year ago. India's Constitution, which is similar to our own, provides for universal suffrage and for the protection of its citizens in a way akin to our own Bill of Rights. The people of India are striving earnestly to establish representative government and democratic institutions as a unified and independent nation.

Like any nation which has just achieved independence, India is confronted with great difficulties—difficulties which have been aggravated by the crisis in Asia caused by the aggressive forces of Communist imperialism. The present food crisis, if permitted to continue, would magnify these difficulties and threaten the stability of India.

It is important to the free world that the democratic institutions which are emerging in India be maintained and strengthened. With a population of almost 350 million people, India has substantial mineral resources and important indus-

tries. Its continued stability is essential to the future of free institutions in Asia.

I recognize that there are important political differences between our Government and the Government of India with regard to the course of action which would most effectively curb aggression and establish peace in Asia. However, these differences should not blind us to the needs of the Indian people. These differences must not deflect us from our tradition of friendly aid to alleviate human suffering.

It is not our objective in foreign affairs to dominate other nations. Our objective is to strengthen the free nations through cooperation—free and voluntary cooperation based on a common devotion to freedom. Our actions have demonstrated our adherence to this objective throughout the world. It is natural that the Indian people should turn to us for aid in meeting the threat of famine that now confronts them. We should meet their appeal in the spirit which guides our relations with all free nations.

I am confident that the American people and their representatives in Congress will respond to this urgent call for help. Already, numerous voices from all over the country have urged the Government to send food; and a number of Members of both parties in the Congress are strongly supporting this popular demand.

I have had the executive departments concerned make a careful study of our ability to meet the Indian request. We do not have an oversupply of food grains. Our current carry-over of grain stocks is not excessive for a critical period like the present. Nevertheless, from a supply standpoint it is possible for us to make available up to 2 million tons of grain without reaching the danger point. Inland transportation and other facilities to bring the grain to shipside will present some difficulties in light of other heavy demands. To provide sufficient ocean transportation to get the grain to India in time, it will be necessary to take some ships from our reserve fleet and recondition them. These ships, on their return voyages, can also help to relieve the shortage of shipping which now impedes the flow of scarce materials to this country.

The Indian Government finds that it is not now able to pay cash for the additional 2 million tons. It is, however, prepared to pay, and will pay, the very substantial ocean-freight charges. India has limited foreign-exchange reserves, and will have a somewhat unfavorable balance of payments this year. It is planning to use the major portion of its reserves, beyond the necessary cover for its currency, on a long-range economic development program. It is, of course, of major importance that India develop its resources and provide a better economic base for its citizens, many of whom live in dire poverty. Unless India can undertake such a program, its economic troubles will increase, the standard of living of its people will continue to

decline, and there will be no end to its history of recurrent famine.

In view of these factors, and the pressing need for immediate assistance, it seems desirable to make a substantial portion of the requested grain available promptly on a grant basis, with India paying for the cost of transportation. This initial grant will avert the imminent danger and provide time to explore in greater detail the need for the balance of the Indian request and to determine the best way of supplying the amounts needed.

I therefore recommend that the Congress, at this time, authorize the full amount requested by the Indian Government, but that it appropriate funds now only for the first million tons, deferring the appropriation of funds for the balance until the situation has been further clarified.

If the Congress adopts this program, I propose that a mission be sent to India under the Economic Cooperation Administration to observe the distribution of the grain and to assist in carrying out the program. This mission would make an on-the-spot appraisal of the full extent of the Indian needs. It would examine other supply possibilities and the terms upon which additional grain should be supplied from the United States.

As in the case of other foreign aid programs, we would expect our representatives in India to be given every opportunity to observe the distribution of the grain and to be sure that the aid we are supplying is distributed fairly. We would also expect that the Indian people be kept informed through full and continuous publicity as to the source of the grain. Similarly, we would expect the Government of India to deposit in a special account local currency equivalent to the proceeds from the sale in India of the grain we supply on a grant basis. This account would be used for the development and improvements of the Indian economy.

As the Congress is aware, this is the practice we have followed in those countries which have received aid under the programs of the Economic Cooperation Administration. In the case of India, such counterpart funds would offer a splendid opportunity for the improvement of Indian agriculture, the development of important natural resources and industries, and other projects of benefit to the people of India. We would also expect the Government of India to do all it can to expand supplies and otherwise to lessen the danger from crop shortages in the future.

The purpose of this program is to meet the current emergency in India, and to stimulate measures to forestall such crises in the future. It does not constitute a precedent for continuing to provide food to India on a grant basis or for providing similar aid for other countries.

I strongly urge that the Congress take immediate steps to put this program into effect. It is within our means. Human lives depend upon our taking prompt action. Shipments must begin

by April if this food is to reach India in time to meet the present emergency.

In this critical time in the affairs of the world, it is vital that the democratic nations show their concern for the well-being of men everywhere and their desire for a better life for mankind. But words alone are not sufficient. We must implement our words by deeds. We must counter the false promises of Communist imperialism with constructive action for human betterment. In this way, and in this way only, can we make human liberty secure against the forces which threaten it throughout the world today.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 12, 1951.

Japanese Request for Post-Treaty Fisheries Negotiation

[Released to the press February 13]

LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA TO AMBASSADOR DULLES

February 7, 1951

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR, In connection with conversations which we have had about fisheries, I am glad to advise you as follows:

The Japanese people largely depend upon fish for their food supply. They have, therefore, a very special interest in the conservation and development of fisheries. The Japanese Government recognize that the problem of conserving and developing fisheries located in the high seas is a difficult one, and that these fisheries may be quickly exhausted unless there is concerted action for the conservation and development of fisheries. We are aware of the fact that certain countries have adopted international agreements and voluntary self-denying ordinances to prevent the exhaustion of high seas fisheries which are readily accessible to fishermen of their own country, and that if these conserved fisheries were to be subjected to uncontrolled fishing from other countries, the result would be international friction and the exhaustion of the fisheries themselves.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government will, as soon as practicable after the restoration to it of full sovereignty, be prepared to enter into negotiations with other countries with a view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and conservation of fisheries which are ac-

cessible to the nationals of Japan and such other countries.

In the meantime, the Japanese Government will, as a voluntary act, implying no waiver of their international rights, prohibit their resident nationals and vessels from carrying on fishing operations in presently conserved fisheries in all waters where arrangements have already been made, either by international or domestic act, to protect the fisheries from overharvesting, and in which fisheries Japanese nationals or vessels were not in the year 1940 conducting operations. Among such fisheries would be the salmon, halibut, herring, sardine and tuna fisheries in the waters of the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea.

The Japanese Government will set up a commission, composed of representatives of both government and industry, whose duty it shall be to see that the above-mentioned prohibition is fully observed, and duly appointed representatives of interested foreign governments will be invited to sit on the commission as observers.

Any party the commission finds guilty of violation shall be subject to substantial penalty, including revocation of his fisheries license.

I trust that the foregoing voluntary arrangements will constitute convincing evidence of the desire of the Japanese Government to deal with this whole problem in an equitable manner, designed to promote good will and the mutual interest of all who, directly or indirectly, depend for their livelihood upon fishing in the high seas.

REPLY FROM AMBASSADOR DULLES TO PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA

TOKYO, JAPAN, February 7, 1951

MY DEAR MISTER PRIME MINISTER: I am in receipt of your letter of February 7 with relation to high seas fisheries. I note with gratification the position of your government as therein set forth.

It is a good omen for the future that the Japanese Government should already now indicate its willingness voluntarily to take measures for the protection of conserved fisheries.

The Government of the United States, and I am confident other governments concerned, will be prepared, promptly after the restoration to Japan of full sovereignty by a peace treaty, to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and conservation of fisheries which are accessible to the nationals of our countries. I am confident that our government will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will corresponding to that which motivates your letter to me.

The Turn of the Tide

by Edward W. Barrett
*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Now, I would like to get right down to business and talk with you about the so-called cold war and about the part being played in it by our vastly increased Campaign of Truth.

It's high time that we Americans stop being defeatist. As a result of the major debates of the last few weeks, it is clear that this nation is today rejecting the retreatist, storm-cellar philosophy on military matters. It's also time that we Americans reject defeatism on psychological matters.

Who said that we are losing the so-called cold war? Certainly not the Russians! On the contrary, they are right now accusing us of such successes that they are trying to persuade the peoples of Europe that their Governments have sold out to us.

Now, it is perfectly right that we should refuse to be satisfied with our efforts. Any trace of complacency, any attempt to justify success by generalities, should be knocked down at once. But the record shows the opposite to what the apostles of despair and self-doubt are claiming. Back in 1947, the defenses of the free world were nonexistent. The only thing stirring was the realization of danger, and the first great move was to shore up the crumbling economic and such structure of Western Europe. The Communist Parties, in all the critical countries in Western Europe, could call a political strike when they chose to and tie up any country's economy for an indefinite period.

Signs of Weakening in Communism

The situation today would have appeared miraculous, indeed incredible, to many a well-informed political observer in 1948.

Let's take the case of France, where we can see that the Communist Party has suffered successive

and continual losses in prestige and effectiveness since 1947. In 1949-1950, the Communists were unable to touch off a strike of any real importance. They have lost two-thirds of the members in the Communist-dominated federation in spite of constant agitation. The Communists flopped in their strenuous efforts to persuade the French people to reject the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

They have not even succeeded in preventing or delaying the unloading of a single ship bringing military material to France. In spite of their threats and claims, they have not been able to interfere with the transportation of such equipment to the military bases within their country. The circulation of their leading newspaper has dropped in the last 5 years from 500,000 to just over 200,000.

Let's note how the Communist vote has declined in elections throughout Europe. Even in Austria, one-third still under the Soviet Army's heel, the voters have turned out Communist officials. The defection of key Communist leaders in Italy is significant.

Then, look at the satellites. Despite 5 years of complete Soviet domination, 60 to 90 percent of the satellite populations are now clearly anti-Kremlin.

In the Far East, the picture, of course, is less rosy. Distrust of Western nations, in general, is strong. But we have multiple indications that the low point has been reached and that the tide has probably turned. The unbelievably vicious Hate-America campaign which has been conducted in China for 3 months has proved disappointing to the Communists. And, as stooge Chinese troops are paying an increasingly dreadful price for their aggression in Korea, the first signs of unrest in this adventure are beginning to show on the Chinese home front. I don't mean to imply that a revolt in China is in the offing—or anything like it. I do mean to imply that, from

¹ Excerpts from an address delivered at St. Louis, Mo., on Feb. 16 and released to the press on the same date.

a low point, the tide seems to have turned in much of the far East.

Factors in the Decline

Now, mind you, I don't say all this is by any means attributable to the accomplishment of the Government's Campaign of Truth. Propaganda—particularly our propaganda of truth—depends on action. The actions of the nations of the free world have paved the way. The Marshall Plan has played a great role. General Eisenhower is a major factor in Europe. Our toughness against great odds in Korea has heralded to the world that aggressors will pay a stupendous toll. And the Soviet rulers themselves, by their own crass and often blundering propaganda, have contributed to their own declining influence. Particularly, in their enormously expensive effort to make us seem the aggressors in Korea, they have failed miserably and have convinced millions of once-credulous people that they are incredible liars.

I do say that this Government's Campaign of Truth, together with the smaller information services of other Governments and various private media, have played a great role in blazoning these truths to the world. And, accordingly, the big lie is losing ground, rapidly in some areas, before the new truth offensive of the free world.

In the free world of today, there is still far too much feeling that the current crisis is basically a conflict of the United States with the U.S.S.R. and that the rest of the world should attempt to remain neutral. You do not combat this sort of sentiment most effectively by simply disseminating a lot of literature, films with the United States label or the United States flag stamped all over them. Hence, in addition to our well-known radio and other activities, a very large part of our work today consists of stimulating and assisting like-minded organizations abroad to expose Kremlin communism and to drive home the reasons for strength and unity in the free world. There is nothing tricky about this. All the organizations concerned are groups who see the world picture as we see it. But they do need research help and ideas and assistance of many kinds.

We are ready, willing, and able to provide such cooperation. I estimate that more than 4 hundred million pieces of literature of this sort, for example, have been distributed in recent months. We cooperated in a very wholehearted way on all of them.

This sort of thing is duplicated time and again in other fields. We cannot take any public credit for the specific items involved, but I hardly need to tell you that it is tremendously effective in the cause for which we are all fighting. I know you will agree with me that it often is infinitely more effective than the flamboyant techniques which some would advocate. You cannot plaster the

countryside of a sensitive, sophisticated nation with American billboards, unless you want to arouse antagonism. You can work on an intelligent, decent, and cooperative basis with hundreds of local organizations, with infinitely more telling effect.

Accelerating the Propaganda Program

Now, let me mention briefly some of the things we are doing to step up the program.

For many months, now, we have had a team of top scientists, many of them generously lent us by major industrial concerns, working on some of our most intricate radio broadcasting problems. Their recommendations tally thoroughly with what we have done but urge much more. We are moving rapidly to put their entire plan into effect. I cannot go into detail, but I can say, without any hesitation, that the best brains in the country are currently employed on developing the most effective possible means of communicating the truth.

In the field of what we say, we also have a team of which I am immensely proud. Working in this program for a long time, we have had scores of extraordinarily able people who have now become outstanding specialists in this delicate service. They include dozens of former first-rank newspaper correspondents, including the ex-heads of some major press services and newspaper bureaus in world capitals. They include specialists in radio, education, cinema, and advertising. All of these are men and women who forsook promising careers to devote themselves to this public service. Among our foreign-language experts, all of them fully investigated by the FBI, are many of the former top-rank editors and radio commentators of other lands.

To these, we have recently been adding a very major infusion of new blood. We have brought 575 selected individuals into the program since October, and hundreds more are steadily being added. Among those who have joined us in recent weeks, mostly on a full-time basis, are one of the best-known editors in the Nation, the director of research of one of our great networks, two top executives of major advertising agencies, one of the best-known publication distributors in the Nation, a score of well-known newspaper correspondents, a former top movie executive, and a dozen distinguished social scientists, plus several score experts on various foreign lands and languages. In addition, we have the part-time help of more than a hundred of the best-known editors, radio people, film executives, public relations people, educators, and religious leaders, who are serving on our advisory commissions and advisory panels. We have every reason to be enormously proud of those who are working in this field.

The World Is Watching Us

I say to you, in all seriousness, I am convinced that the tide has turned and turned importantly in the so-called battle for men's minds. We and our fellow free nations have recruited the brains and are rapidly acquiring the machinery to do the job. But I have come to the conclusion that the single ingredient, which the chemical mixture of the free world needs today, in order to burn with incandescent heat, is the ingredient of confidence and a faith in ourselves and in the future.

Many foreigners are struck and puzzled by an atmosphere of self-doubt in the United States. They tell me that every time the United States seems to lose faith in itself and in its allies, Communist propaganda is encouraged, and our partners are themselves depressed.

As our strength grows, it will breed more strength, and our words and attitudes must express that fundamental fact. Today, our only real risk of losing the battle for men's minds is the risk of believing ourselves to be capable of losing it. This does not mean that we can be satisfied and complacent. I repeat, there is no degree of effort which we can consider adequate if we are to succeed. Much will depend on our ability to marshal, within us, inner and powerful resources which our people have always shown in times of adversity and which have never seemed stronger than when the odds appeared to be overwhelmingly against us. The world is watching us. We must show the resoluteness, the determination, and the confidence that we have every right to show.

Lithuanian Independence Day Symbol of Freedom

*Statement by Edward W. Barrett
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

It gives me particular pleasure to participate in the opening program of the Lithuanian language transmissions of the Voice of America, on this day, February 16, when Lithuanians and their many friends everywhere are celebrating Lithuanian Independence Day.

The people and the Government of the United States, through these broadcasts, will seek to convey the genuine interest and concern which they

¹ Broadcast on Feb. 16 over the Voice of America upon the inauguration of regular daily programs in the Lithuanian language and released to the press on the same date.

take in the welfare of the Lithuanian people. The concern which is felt for the position of the Lithuanian people is not new. It was most forcefully expressed in a statement issued by the United States Government on July 23, 1940. On that date, the United States Government issued the following declaration:

During these past few days the devious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion.

From the day when the peoples of these republics first gained their independent and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.

The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak.

These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign republics of the New World rests.

The United States will continue to stand by these principles, because of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and of law—in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself—cannot be preserved.²

That was a United States Government statement issued July 23, 1940.

The adherence of the United States to the fundamental principles expressed at that time is indicated by the fact that this Government has not recognized the incorporation of Lithuania into the U. S. S. R. and continues to recognize the diplomatic and consular representatives of Lithuania in the United States.

The Lithuanian broadcasts of the Voice of America will convey to the Lithuanian people a factual and unbiased picture of the motives and aims which guide the United States in its international relations. Our aims are: peace, freedom, and justice for all.

These broadcasts will also endeavor to bring to the people of Lithuania a true report on the contemporary American scene and the efforts of the people of the United States to achieve a fuller and richer life for all those who cherish freedom and liberty.

It is with these thoughts that I transmit to the people of Lithuania my own greetings as well as the greetings of the people and of the Government of the United States.

² BULLETIN of July 27, 1940, p. 48.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Rebuttal to Soviet Claim of U.S. Aggression in China and Violation of Chinese Airspace

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
Deputy, U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The spokesmen for the Soviet Union—those who speak directly in its name and those who invariably follow its set line—have continued to reiterate charges made here again today that the United States has invaded the island of Formosa, has committed economic aggression there, and has intervened in the internal affairs of China. The vast majority of the members of the Political Committee have already found these charges to be baseless. My Government now again states plainly that these charges are false, a complete tissue of lies and distortions.

The President of the United States has repeatedly made it clear that the United States has no aggressive designs or ambitions—political, military, or economic—with respect to Formosa. The United States Seventh Fleet was sent to the Straits of Formosa for only one purpose—to prevent the spread of armed conflict in the Far East. The extension of conflict in that area would obviously have threatened the success of the United Nations effort to repel aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Seventh Fleet was not sent to Formosan waters on this mission until after the Security Council adopted its resolution of June 25. It is, moreover, absurd to argue that the 49 officers and men of the United States armed services stationed on Formosa constitute an invasion of that island. Apart from the small numbers involved, they are there with the express authori-

zation of the Government of the Republic of China.

The fact remains—and this is the basic fact in our judgment—that the Soviet spokesmen here in the Assembly and in the Committee have persisted in attacking the basis of American friendship for China and the Chinese people. I think that the memory of the Chinese people and any history of China not written in Moscow will be sufficient proof that American friendship for the Chinese peoples has been and continues to be sincere and fundamental. The nation—and the only nation—which controls many thousands of square miles of territory which were once Chinese is not the United States but the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Austin gave to the First Committee facts disproving the Soviet charges that the United States had blockaded Formosa or had committed economic aggression there. The United States delegation took up Mr. Vyshinsky's claim about United States control of natural resources of Formosa and showed in detail that they were completely unfounded. No such control exists. But, I wonder what the Polish and Czechoslovak spokesmen here could say about economic aggression against their countries—and economic aggression by whom?

The argument has also been made that the United States involves itself in aggression by continuing to recognize and deal with the Government of the Republic of China. I would only say to that the reasons which impel us to continue recognizing that Government are, we believe, honorable and in the best interest of the Chinese people. Moreover, the claimant to recognition has been

¹ Made before the plenary session of the General Assembly on Feb. 13 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

named an aggressor by the United Nations and until its aggression ceases, its claim can have no moral basis whatsoever upon the peace-loving nations of the world.

The second Soviet resolution concerns alleged violations of Chinese airspace by United States aircraft and has been put forward here again by the very country which has by its veto refused to allow any impartial investigation of its charges by the Security Council. Last fall, the United States admitted in the Council that, through errors which all familiar with high speed air war will recognize as inevitable, attacks on Manchurian territory might have occurred. In order that the Council could know whether they actually occurred, the United States proposed a commission made up of India and Sweden, two countries in close diplomatic relationship with the Chinese Communist regime, proposed that such a commission be sent immediately to the site of the alleged attack in order to make thorough investigation. The Soviet Union vetoed this proposal.

When the Soviets continued to press their charges in the General Assembly, the United States delegate, Mr. Dulles, showed by means of a map that the Soviet spokesman himself did not assert that any bombs had fallen on the Man-

churian side of the Yalu River, and the map based upon Mr. Vyshinsky's own statements made it clear that, if any such attacks did occur, they were solely against the bridges and river crossings where Chinese Communist armies were pouring into Korea to subjugate the northern part of that country and carry out their aggression against the forces of the United Nations.

The Soviet resolution reintroduced here must be appraised in the light of the fact that large Chinese Communist armies are now attacking in force United Nations forces in Korea.

Mr. President, in time, perhaps, the Chinese Communists will learn that armed aggression anywhere and at any time is fraught with disaster for the aggressors. Certainly, they may one day consider what nation urged upon them their present venture, and they may remember that it was that same nation which by its veto prevented the Security Council from taking action upon their original complaint about this so-called violation of the airspace over China's border on Korea.

It is for the reasons which I have mentioned with regard to both resolutions that the Government of the United States has voted against the first and will vote against the second.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works (ILO)

The Department of State announced on February 12 that the third session of the Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee of the International Labor Organization, which opens at Geneva will be attended by the following:

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

Herman B. Byer, Assistant Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
Jacob L. Crane, Assistant to the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington, D.C.

Adviser

Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American Legation, Bern, Resident at Geneva

EMPLOYERS REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

Samuel L. Fuller, President, John F. Casey Company, Box 1888, Pittsburgh
Lester C. Rogers, President, Bates and Rogers Construction Corporation, 600 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago

WORKERS REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

Howard McSpedon, President, New York City Building and Construction Trades Council, 441 Lexington Avenue, New York
John J. Moersch, Associate Counsel, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union, 105 West Madison, Chicago

At its third session, the Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee will consider a general report dealing in particular with (1) action taken in the various countries in the light of the conclusions of its first two sessions; (2) steps taken by the International Labor Office to carry out the studies and inquiries proposed by the Committee at its previous sessions; and (3) recent events and developments in the construction industry. The Committee will also devote special attention to questions relating to welfare and seasonal unemployment in the construction industry.

The Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee is one of nine industrial committees established by the Governing Body of the

International Labor Office. The other industrial committees are concerned with chemicals; coal mines; inland transport; iron and steel; metal trades; petroleum, textiles, and work on plantations. Through meetings of these committees, in which government, employer, and worker representatives from various countries participate, the International Labor Organization is able to give close attention to the economic and social problems of the particular industries.

Representatives from the United States participated in the first session of the Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee, held at Brussels, November 25-December 3, 1946, and also in the second session, held at Rome, March 16-25, 1949.

Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 12 that the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the United Nations Economic and Social Council will hold a series of three meetings at Lahore, Pakistan, beginning on February 14, 1951. These meetings are the seventh session of the Commission, February 28-March 7; the third session of the Committee on Industry and Trade, February 15-26; and the third session of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel, February 14-16.

Merrill C. Gay, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, has been designated as the United States representative, with the personal rank of Minister, to the seventh session of the Commission and the third session of the Committee on Industry and Trade. Wilson Sweeney, Economic Officer, American Consulate, Calcutta, has been designated as the United States representative to the third session of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel. Other members of the United States delegations to the three meetings are as follows:

Seventh Session of the ECAFE

Advisers

Niles W. Bond, Office of the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo

Edward Dahl, American Embassy, Karachi

William W. Diehl, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Rufus Burr Smith, American Embassy, Bangkok

David W. Wainhouse, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

Third Session of the Committee on Industry and Trade

Advisers (in addition to those listed above)

William D. Johnston, Jr., Chief, Alaskan and Foreign Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Wilson Sweeney, Economic Officer, American Consulate, Calcutta

Carlton L. Wood, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Third Session of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel

Advisers

William D. Johnston, Jr., Chief, Alaskan and Foreign Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

David W. Wainhouse, Office of the United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, one of the three regional economic commissions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), was established by an Ecosoc resolution adopted on March 28, 1947. The purpose of the ECAFE is (a) to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East, for raising the level of economic activity in Asia and the Far East, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of these areas, both among themselves and with other countries of the world; (b) to make or sponsor investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and developments within territories of Asia and the Far East; and (c) to undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of economic, technological, and statistical information.

The third session of the Committee on Industry and Trade and the third session of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel will be concerned with various technical problems in their respective subject fields and will report to the seventh session of the Commission. In addition to consideration of the reports of these and other committees, the seventh session will discuss questions relating, among other things, to technical assistance for economic development, the continued cooperation of the ECAFE with the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international bodies, and the adoption of the annual report to be submitted to Ecosoc. Consideration is to be given to the inclusion in the annual report of a summary of the Commission's work for the last 4 years, an appraisal of its achievements, and an examination of fields for future work.

The United States in the United Nations

[February 16-22, 1951]

General Assembly

Committee on Additional Measures.—At the first meeting of this Committee on February 16, Ambassador Selim Sarper (Turkey), Joseph Nisot (Belgium), and K. C. O. Shann (Australia) were elected chairman, vice chairman, and rapporteur, respectively. Set up by the Assembly on February 1 under a United States resolution declaring the Chinese Communists to be aggressors in Korea, the Committee's membership comprises Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. (Burma and Yugoslavia have declined to serve.) Its report to the Assembly will be deferred if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress toward achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea. These committees met jointly on February 19.

Trusteeship Council

The Council devoted the greater part of the week to consideration and discussion of the third annual report to the United Nations by the United States on its administration of the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. (The territory includes three groups of Micronesian Islands: the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas, with the exception of Guam.) This report describes the political, economic, social, and educational developments in the territory from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950.

Francis B. Sayre (U.S.) advised the Council that responsibility for the civil administration of this trust territory had been transferred as of January 8, 1951 from the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior and that former Senator Elbert D. Thomas had been appointed High Commissioner. Since serious dislocations might occur if all naval facilities were abruptly withdrawn, the transfer would be effected gradually. Mr. Sayre introduced the Deputy High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Leon S. Fiske, special representative of the territory, to present the annual report and answer questions. Admiral Fiske stated that the two major factors involved in administration were the wide physical and cultural differences separating groups of the indigenous population. Politically, the administering authority had encouraged the development of regional advisory congresses. Through such congresses, the inhabitants would gain more knowledge of legislative procedures and would be

granted more authority. The greatest political advancement had taken place on the local level. A proposed organic act for the territory has recently been reviewed with a view to submitting a new draft to the present Congress. Economically, the administering authority was, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the inhabitants, endeavoring to diversify the agricultural, industrial, and commercial life of the area. In March 1950, the Island Trading Company (an agency of the territorial government) had established an Economic Development Fund of \$100,000 to be used to promote and diversify economic activities.

The administering authority has an active program for the reconstitution of land records and land boundaries, and the homesteading of public domain lands. The betterment of social conditions in the territory is carried out through the administering authorities continually expanding, inter-related programs for the development of self-government, economic self-sufficiency, medical care, and education. A free public school system has been established and more than 90 percent of the children of school age are enrolled in schools. The administration expected that the number of inhabitants with a secondary or higher education would be greater each year, and it was particularly fostering political education and appreciation of democratic process through the municipalities and district councils. Admiral Fiske stated that the United Nations flag is being flown in the trust territory side by side with the United States flag in compliance with a resolution of the General Assembly. Also, a flag contest had been conducted to choose a territorial flag.

The United Nations Visiting Mission observed in 1950 that "In view of the Territory's lack of resources the present laudable rate of development could be maintained only if the United States continued its generous aid."

The majority of the members commented favorably on the work of the administering authority, commended the transfer of the territory to civilian administration, and offered several constructive criticisms. Final action on the report will be taken at a subsequent meeting.

At a meeting on the 20th, two additional items were acted upon: (1) agreement was reached that the President should cable the Ewe petitioners that they would be given a hearing during consideration of the Ewe question, which is scheduled to begin on February 26; (2) Mr. Sayre presented the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and stated that all members of that body

had strong feelings for welcoming Italy to the Council's work and in regretting that it was not a United Nations member. The Committee believed it had no power to make any determination on the question of Italy's right to vote, as the Charter limits voting rights to United Nations members. By a vote of 11-0-1 (U.S.S.R.) Italy was granted the right to participate without vote in discussions relating specifically to Somaliland and in general questions relating to the operation of the international trusteeship system. The Italian representative stated that, although his Government would collaborate fully in the task of bringing the Somali people to full independence, it would be of considerable help if Italy's desire for equality of rights could be given "due consideration." In this connection, an Argentine draft resolution was introduced which would request the General Assembly to include the question of Italian voting in the Council on the agenda of the Sixth General Assembly.

Economic and Social Council

The twelfth session of the Economic and Social Council opened its first meeting on February 20 at Santiago and was tendered a warm reception by the Chilean Government. Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) was reelected President. A Soviet motion to unseat the representative of Nationalist China and seat a representative of the People's Republic of China was rejected.

The United States delegation of 14 members is headed by the United States representative, Isador Lubin, and his deputy, Walter Kotschnig, Director, United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, will also attend for a few days.

Items on the Council agenda include a survey of the world economic situation, technical assistance, the financing of the economic development of underdeveloped countries, a survey of the extent of forced labor and means of eliminating it, draft Covenant on Human Rights, allegations regarding infringement of trade-union rights, international cooperation on water control and utilization, questions relating to the coordination of the activities of the specialized agencies, and questions concerning the status of nongovernmental organizations.

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) began a series of three meetings at Lahore, Pakistan, on February 14. Merrill C. Gay, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, is the United States representative to the seventh session of the Commission and the third session of the Committee on Industry and Trade. Wilson Sweeney, Economic Officer, American consulate general, Calcutta, is the United States repre-

sentative to the third session of the subcommittee on Iron and Steel. The seventh session will discuss questions relating to technical assistance for economic development, the continued cooperation of ECAFE with the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international bodies, and the adoption of the annual report to be submitted to the Economic and Social Council. The following member nations comprise the Commission: Australia, Burma, China, France, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States.

Security Council

The Security Council met on February 21 to resume consideration of the Kashmir question for the first time since the appointment of Sir Owen Dixon (Australia), April 12, 1950, as United Nations representative for India and Pakistan. (Sir Owen had filed a report with the Council on September 15, 1950, explaining his failure to carry out the mission entrusted to him.)

Among the items to be considered were Sir Owen's report and a draft resolution cosponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States. The major provisions of this resolution, after affirming the principle that the final disposition of the State will be made by a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices and that the action of the Kashmir National Conference attempting to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State conflicted with this principle, call for: (1) cooperation with a new United Nations representative, who is to effect demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of Sir Owen Dixon's demilitarization proposals or any necessary modifications thereof, and to secure agreement upon a detailed plan for a plebiscite therein; (2) possible use of United Nations or special local forces during demilitarization and the plebiscite; (3) consideration of the possibility of assigning local areas to the party obtaining the minority vote in the state-wide election, in the event of overwhelming local vote in favor of that party; (4) consideration of the possibility that different degrees of supervision over the functions of government in the State might be appropriate for different areas; (5) acceptance of arbitration on any points of difference remaining unresolved; and (6) faithful observance of the cease-fire agreement and refraining from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement.

After presentation of the two statements by the United Kingdom and the United States the meeting adjourned until March 1 in order to permit study of the draft resolution.

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